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CURRENT TRENDS IN AVIATION PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
By WALLACE E. MALONEYt
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE DISPUTES that today bring people into the courts reflect all
too clearly the society in which they arise. A striking example of
this can be found in the extent to which the litigation currently glutting
our courts mirrors our increasing dependence upon the products of
American research and technology. I speak of product liability litigation.
We have integrated into our daily routines such things as television,
powerful automobiles, jet aircraft travel and a variety of gadgetry with-
out having the slightest conception of how most of them function. If
one of these space-age miracles runs amuck, we simply call the repairman.
However, if an injury results from the use of one of these products,
whether it be an automobile, airplane or an underarm deodorant, Amer-
icans go to court and ask twelve laymen to decide exactly what went
wrong. As Samuel Butler somewhat dourly observed, the public does not
know enough to be experts, yet knows enough to decide between them.
The refinements of contemporary science have made the products of
our daily use increasingly complex so that even the highly qualified
scientist has difficulty in communicating with his fellow scientists con-
cerning their internal operation. The chief reason for this is that the
domain of science has countless subdivisions and each subdivision has
its own lexicon. The result is what someone has called "the barbarism of
specialization." The very science that has made possible the creation of
this wonderful and bountiful productivity is erecting a "Tower of Babel"
whose builders do not speak one another's language. The lawyer, for
purposes of his own understanding and for presentation of an under-
standable case to a lay judge and jury, must translate the knowledge of
the most exotic scientist to the simplest, most easily understood language.
The lawyer's need to simplify eliminates many of the fine distinctions for
which scientists develop their own special terminology.
This need to simplify and to clarify on the part of the lawyer makes him
very unpopular with the scientists with whom he must now work. The
tentative nature of many of the scientists' conclusions are a real problem
for the lawyer. For a jury, the lawyer wants a simple story, told as the rock-
bottomed "gospel truth." On the other hand, to the man of science, all
scientific findings are only tentative truth, good until further notice, to
be immediately discarded when some other expert develops another
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theory that perhaps explains a few more of the many mysteries of science.
The manufacturers of aircraft who have been sued in a products lia-
bility case now find themselves in an extremely difficult position. Con-
vinced that their's is "the side of the angels," they are faced with a
plaintiff's counsel who most likely will come into court and show that
his client bought his ticket, boarded the aircraft, securely fastened his
seat belt and then was either grieviously injured or killed. Such an appeal
to a jury of twelve laymen is particularly appealing and one which can
be difficult to counter, both legally and emotionally. If the plaintiff has
sued both the manufacturer and the airlines, he does not care who pays the
recovery and is usually quite happy to see the airline point the finger of
guilt at the manufacturer and vice versa. These interdefendant battles
greatly benefit the plaintiff's case and usually leave both defendants in a
worsened position.
It is clear that both the manufacturer's counsel and the airline's coun-
sel must be able to simply explain the mass of highly complex engineering
data, the aerodynamic principles, the quiet involved physics and yes,
even the law, to both the judge and jury in such a way as to defeat the
cacophony of Babel which has in the past, to some extent, prevented
their effectively demonstrating the merits of their case.
The Bible relates that the "gift of tongues" was bestowed through
divine intervention. Today, faced with strict liability in tort, both the
manufacturer and the airline must not only give up hope of any sort of
divine intervention, but also they must give up all thought of intervention
by either the legislature or the judiciary. Salvation lies only in the de-
fense lawyer's ability to clearly, simply and effectively present the case
to the trier of fact.
In the middle of the 1950's, we witnessed an astronomical rise in
medical malpractice suits.' Between the years 1935 and 1955 there was
a total of 605 reported cases of medical professional liability in the United
States.2 In the year 1959, 6000 physicians were sued for medical mal-
practice.' It soon became patently obvious that the physician-lawyer, or
the lawyer with a broad scientific background was desperately needed to
handle this rather startling assault upon the medical profession.
The situation faced today by the aircraft industry is clearly analogous
to that of the medical profession. There is today a great need for the
aviation attorney, or the attorney who is soundly based in engineering
principles, an attorney who can effectively bridge the gap between the
technical and the vernacular for the jury and overcome the presumption
of guilt that is now the spectre facing manufacturers in general and the
aircraft industry specifically.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
Today, as since its inception, the primary goal of products liability
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law has been the allocation of costs between the manufacturer and the
consumer for injuries caused by defective products. Legal theories have
been devised to effect this allocation and the creativity of the legal pro-
fession in devising means to hasten a change in the state of the law is
borne witness to the movement of the doctrine of caveat emptor4 to that
of negligence,. breach of warranty-express or implied' and finally to
that of strict liability in tort in little less than a century.'
One of the primary tenets at common law is that losses should be borne
by the individual incurring them, unless there is some valid reason for
shifting them from one to another! This was the doctrine of caveat
emptor or "let the buyer beware." Modern products liability law, how-
ever, proclaimed the death of the doctrine of caveat emptor and the
economic background that it once reflected. The disappearance of the
American frontier and the almost total development of this nation's re-
sources, has seriously weakened this doctrine. Initially it was felt that
caveat emptor was particularly adapted to the dynamic and expanding
civilization of the 19th Century-the nation was in a state of flux, highly
dangerous and speculative enterprises which involved high degree of risk
to others were clearly indispensable to "the industrial and commercial
development of the economy of the new and expanding nation."' It was
considered that the interests of those injured by these budding industries
must give way to them, and that too great a burden must not be placed
upon them lest this industrial advance be stultified.
The theory of negligence was the judiciary's first departure from that
doctrine and one that caused considerable consternation among the manu-
facturing class of the day. Under it, the manufacturer was, and is today,
required to exercise reasonable care to assure that the product he sells
does no harm to the buyer.0 It was this imposition of a "duty of care"
4 See generally, W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 648 (3d ed. 1964).
See generally, Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 L.W. REv. 184
(1926); Miles on Treatment of Negligence, Digest of English Civil Law 545 (1910); Gregory,
Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359 (1951); Prosser, The Assault
Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1008; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MNN. L. REV. 791
(1966).
'See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
'The landmark English case from which the doctrine of strict liability in tort developed was
Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H & C 774, 159 Eng. Rat. 737 (1865), reversed in Fletcher v. Rylands,
L.R. I Ex. 265 (1866), aff'd in Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). The first United
States jurisdiction to fully accept the doctrine was California. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
8See W. Prosser, LAW OF TORTS § 53 (3d ed. 1964).9 W. Prosser, LAW OF TORTS 523 (3d ed. 1964).
" For a full study of the development of this departure see Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519,
150 Eng. Rep. 863 (1837), aff'd in 4 M. & W. 338, 150 Eng. Rep. 1458; Thomas v. Winchester,
6 N.Y. 397 (1852); Blood Balm Co. v. Cooper, 83 Ga. 457, 10 S.E. 118 (1852); Norton v. Sewall,
106 Mass. 143 (1870); Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64 (1870); Heaven
v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1882); Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882); Schubert v. J.R. Clark
Co., 49 Minn. 331, 51 N.W. 1103 (1892); Bright v. Barnett & Record Co., 88 Wis. 299, 60
N.W. 418 (1894); Lewis v. Terry, 111 Cal. 39, 43 P. 398 (1896); Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing
Mach. Co., 20 F. 865 (1903); Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N.J.L. 748,,70 A. 314 (1908);
Welhausen v. Charles Parker Co., 83 Conn. 231, 76 A. 271 (1910); Roberts v. Anheuser-Busch
Brewing Ass'n, 211 Mass. 499, 98 N.E. 95 (1912); Boyd v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn.
23, 177 S.W. 80 (1915); Jackson Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864, 64 So.
791 (1914); Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 247 F. 921 (1917); Herman v. Markham Air Rifle Co.,
[Vol. 3 6
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upon the seller that represented a radical departure from caveat emptor.
The contractual relationship between the seller and the buyer constituted
the rationale behind it; and this "duty of care" was subsequently ex-
panded to embrace products sold that were "inherently dangerous."
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.," further opened the floodgates by de-
fining "inherently dangerous"" as any product that was negligently
made, thereby creating in the manufacturer an obligation to exercise the
care of a reasonable man" to ensure his products caused no harm. Further,
it held that the manufacturer of a chattel was liable for negligence re-
sulting in injury to an ultimate purchaser with whom the manufacturer
had no privity of contract, 4 if the product was likely to cause injury if
made negligently.'" Quite rationally, the court had held that if the seller
exercises the required standard of care, the buyer will be unable to recover
under the negligence theory."
The next step in the progression toward the ever-increasing liability
of the manufacturer was the development of warranty law. A warranty,
unlike negligence, is not a fault concept. It is, rather, a contractual agree-
ment and any affirmation of fact or promise or description of the goods
or model or sample will create an express warranty. Warranties, although
part of the common law,"' were first codified in the Uniform Sales Act.'8
Section 15 (2) of the Uniform Sales Act,' and its successor in interest,
Section 2.314 of the Uniform Commercial Code,' contained the oft-
litigated warranty of merchantability," which unless specifically ex-
cluded, is implicit in every contract." This implied warranty of mer-
chantability provides that in every sale by a merchant who deals in
goods of the specific kind, there is an implied warranty that such goods
are merchantable. For the product to be merchantable, it must at least
258 F. 475 (1918); Drury v. Armour & Co., 140 Ark. 371, 216 S.W. 40 (1919); Minutilla v.
Providence Ice Cream Co., 50 R.I. 43, 144 A. 884 (1929); Rogers v. White Metal Rolling &
Stamping Corp., 249 F.2d 262 (1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936 (1957); Lentz v. Hayes Freight
Lines, 302 F.2d 67 (1962).






", Warranties, although part of the common law, see Rogers & Co. v. Niles & Co., 11 Ohio
St. 48 (1960), were codified first in the UNIFORM SALES ACT. Section 15 (2) of the Uniform Sales
Act provided: "Where the goods are brought by description from a seller who deals in goods of
that description . . . there is an implied warranty that the good shall be of merchantable quality.
See § 76 for definitions of "buyer" and "seller" as they are used in the act.
UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15(2) and its successor in interest, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE, §
2-314 contained the oft-litigated warranty of merchantability, which unless specifically excluded, is
implicit'in every contact. This warranty of merchantability provides that the goods ire fit and us-
able for the, general purpose for which they. shall have been sold. 'An action brought under this
provision of the UCC requires that there be a privity of contract which extends to the buyer's
family and guests, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § B-CVR. Further, the warrantor must be given
reasonable notice of a breach of implied warranty, § 2-607. The Code also allows the seller to ex-
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pass without objection in the trade under the contract description. In the
case of fungible goods, it must be of fair to average quality within the
parameters of the description; be fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are normally used; run, within the variation permitted by the
agreement in question, of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit
and among all of the units involved; be adequately contained according to
the terms of the agreement; and conform to any promises or affirmations
of fact made on the label of the packaging.
Perhaps the most important test of the above is "fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are normally used" and it is the failure
to live up to this promise that is the usual claim in a warranty of mer-
chantability suit. As is the case in all implied warranty causes of action,
it is of no import that the seller himself did not know of the specific
defect or that he could not have discovered it. Implied warranties are
not based upon any theory of negligence, as noted before, but upon
absolute liability which is imposed upon certain sellers.
More germane to the discussion at hand is the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose, which is set forth in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, Section 2-315. This warranty arises whenever any seller,
whether he be merchant or otherwise, has reason to know the particular
purpose for which the product is to be used and that the purchaser is
relying on the seller's skill and judgment to select suitable goods. The
comment to the section states, "A particular purpose differs from the
ordinary purpose for which goods are used in that it envisages a specific
use by the buyer which is peculiar to the nature of his business, whereas
the ordinary purposes for which goods are used are those envisaged in
the concept of merchantability ... .""
An action brought under either of these provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code requires that there be a privity of contract, which
extends to the buyer's family and guests of the buyer, and that the
warrantor be given reasonable notice of a breach of implied warranty.'4
The Code, in an attempt to place the buyer and seller on a somewhat
equal legal footing, allows the seller to exclude or modify all warranties,
including the warranty of merchantability and fitness for purpose.'
The warranty of merchantability can be disclaimed or modified only
by mentioning merchantability and, in the case of a writing, making the
disclaimer clearly conspicuous. Section 1-201 (10) of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code states:
A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person
against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed heading
in capitals is conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is conspicuous if
it is in larger or other contrasting type or color.
I might add parenthetically that it is the court and not the jury that
decides any fact question as to the conspicuousness of the disclaimer. The
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315, Comment (2).
14 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318.
5 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316.
[Vol. 36
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warranty of fitness for purpose may likewise be disclaimed also by the
inclusion of a conspicuous writing which states in essence that there are
no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face of the
contract in question."
Judicial interpretation of both sections of the Uniform Commercial
Code has considerably served to expand their original scope. Privity of
contract has in recent years, for example, broken down considerably and
some courts have permitted recovery on the theory that a warranty runs
with the chattel" or that a manufacturer's advertisements create express
warranties directly to consumers.' Still other courts have indicated that
notice requirements and disclaimers are inapplicable to products liability
actions for breach of implied warranty.'
It was with this state of the law as a backdrop that the doctrine of
strict liability made its apperance upon the American judicial scene. The
first judicial decision to suggest the theory of strict liability in tort in
this country, then denominated as "absolute liability," was the concur-
ring opinion of then Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.'5
This was some seventeen years prior to Professor Prosser's espousal of
the doctrine of strict liability in tort in his article "The Assault Upon The
Citadel."" It would be 20 years before Justice Traynor would find a
vehicle with which to further advance his espousal of this doctrine. In
his majority opinion for Greeninan v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., the
court held that "a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article
he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection
for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."'
Today, in a products liability case, tried under the theory of strict
liability in tort, the plaintiff must establish the defendant's relationship
with the product, that the injury or damage resulted from a defective
condition of that product, which is an unreasonably dangerous one, and
which existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's or seller's
control." The theory allows a purchaser to recover from all sellers in the
26 Id.
27Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 S. 305 (1937).
28 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 337 P.2d 897 (1963).
"Rudderman v. Warner Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., 23 Conn. Supp. 416, 184 A.2d 63
(1962).
a°In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944), Justice Traynor
stated in his concurring opinion: "In my opinion it should now be recognized that a manufacturer
incurs an absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is
to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings . . .
even if there is no negligence . . . public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever
it will most effectively reduce the hazard to life and health inherent in defective products that
reach the market."
a1 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
3 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962). Chief Justice Traynor in refusing to apply the
traditional warranty concept stated: "Although in these cases strict liability has usually been
based on a theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the
plaintiff the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them the recognition that the
liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law . ..and the refusal to permit the manu-
facturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products . . . make it clear
that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict
liability in tort."
aaGreenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (1962).
"See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962); Vander-
1970]
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distributive chain without regard to privity of contract. It also allows
an injured person who was not a purchaser to recover from the same
individuals.' Thus, this doctrine is a dynamic and frighteningly ever-
expanding one.A In a recent appellate court decision, it was suggested
mark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168 (1964). Seely v. White Motor Co., 63
Cal. 2d 1, 403 P.2d 145 (1965); Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961);
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 I11. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Santor v. A & M Karagheu-
sian Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). See generally Prosser, The Fall of The Citadel, 50
MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
3533 A.L.R.3d 415.
31 ALABAMA Is Not A Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The privity requirement is still ap-
plied by the Alabama courts in negligent suits against manufacturers and sellers of products al-
leged to have caused personal injury or property damage, but the inherently dangerous and immi-
nently dangerous product exceptions to the privity of rule are recognized in this state. Defore v.
Bourjois, Inc., 268 Ala. 228, 105 S.2d 846 (1958); Greyhound Corporation v. Brown, 269 Ala.
520, 113 S.2d 916 (1959); Remington Arms Company, Inc. v. Wilkins, 387 F.2d 48 (5th Cir.
1967). Alabama courts still view privity as essential to recovery for breach of warranty. Collins
Baking Company v. Savage, 227 Ala. 408, 150 S. 336 (1933); Bilitstein v. Ford Motor Company,
228 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1961). The food and beverage exception to the privity requirement is also
recognized in Alabama. Birmingham Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 S. 64
(1921).
ALASKA Is A Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Alaska recently expressly
embraced the doctrine of strict liability in tort in the area of products liability. Both sellers and
manufacturers are covered. Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969).
ARIZONA Is A Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The Restatement formulation of strict liability
in tort, § 402A, has been embraced to cover sellers and manufacturers. By ample warning, how-
ever, a seller can exonerate himself. 0. S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968) ;
Eck v. Helene Curtiss Industries, Inc., 9 Ariz. App. 426, 453 P.2d 366 (1969); plus several other
recent Arizona Appellate cases. Strict liability recovery has even been extended to a bystander.
Caruth v. Mariani, 463 P.2d 83 (Ariz. App. 1970). Strict liability protection has been denied to
a plaintiff who voluntarily exposed himself to a known obvious danger. Maas v. Dreher, 460 P.2d
191 (Ariz. App. 1969).
ARKANSAS Is Not A Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The Arkansas courts have held that the
requirement of privity in negligence actions is inapplicable only in actions against manufacturers
or sellers of imminently dangerous or inherently dangerous products and in actions where the in-
jury was caused by an unwholesome fool product. Reynolds v. Manley, 223 Ark. 314, 365 S.W.2d
714 (1954); Chappman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949); Drury
v. Armour & Co., 140 Ark. 371, 216 S.W. 40 (1919). The privity requirement has been held
applicable in actions in which recovery for a product-cause injury is sought on the ground of
breach of warranty. Green v. Equitable Powder Mfg. Co., 95 F. Supp. 127 (W.D. Ark. 1951);
but recently the Arkansas Supreme Court has reserved the right to review the entire matter of
privity in all cases of breach of warranty. Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 238 Ark. 534, 383 S.W.2d
885 (1964). The subject of strict liability was recently raised in Flippo v. Mode O'Day Frock
Shops of Hollywood, 449 S.W.2d 692 (Ark. 1970), and while § 402A of the Restatement was
quoted and distinguished-not rejected out of hand-the supreme court still appeared unready to
embrace the doctrine, even on more appropriate facts.
CALIFORNIA Is A Strict Liability Jurisdiction. California has judicially embraced the doc-
trine of strict liability in tort in the area of product liability. Greeman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Company, 61 Cal. 2d 256,
391 P.2d 168 (1964); Seely v. Whte Motor Company, 63 Cal. 2d 1, 403 P.2d 145 (1965). The
California lower courts have considered quite a number of recent cases in which they have con-
strued the strict liability doctrine very liberally. A product has been deemed "defective" merely
because the seller did not give a warning whn such omission was unreasonably dangerous. Gherna
v. Ford Motor Company, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966). See also Gutierrez v. San Francisco, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1966); Martinez v. Nichols, 52 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1966); Barth v. B. F. Goodrich Tire
Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968); Casetta v. U. S. Rubber, 67 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1968). Exception to
the strict liability rule has been acknowledged where products incapable of being made safe for
intended use are properly prepared and marketed. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr.
398 (1967).
COLORADO-The Status of the Law of Colorado As to Strict Liability is Presently in Doubt.
No state court decisions have faced the issue, but at least two federal courts have construed Colo-
rado law to impose strict liability in tort in products liability cases. Newton v. Admiral Corpora-
tion, 280 F. Supp. 202 (D. Colo. 1967) and Schenfeld v. Norton Co., 391 F.2d 420 (10th Cir.
1968). No Colorado state court decisions confront the issue of privity in negligence actions either.
An earlier 10th circut court case did recognize the inherently dangerous exception to the privity
requirement in a negligence case. White v. Rose, 241 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1957).
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CONNECTICUT Is a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The courts have recently judicially em-
braced the doctrine of strict liability in tort. Garthwart v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 290, 216 A.2d 189
(1965); Rossignal v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, 154 Conn. 549, 227 A.2d 418 (1967);
De Felice v. Ford Motor Company, 28 Conn. Supp. 164, 255 A.2d 636 (Super. Ct. 1969);
Gugelielmo v. Klauser Supply Co., 158 Conn. 308, 259 A.2d 608 (1969). This development con-
firmed the earlier prediction of a federal district court. Chairaluce v. The Stanley Warner Man-
agement Corp., 236 F. Supp. 385 (D. Conn. 1964). Recently a federal court of appeals read into
Connecticut Law the "unavoidably unsafe" exception to strict tort liability, provided the manu-
facturer gives sufficient warning of the unavoidably unsafe condition. Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969).
DELAWARE Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The Delaware Supreme Court has ex-
plicitly refused to embrace the doctrine of strict liability in tort. Ciociola v. Delaware Coca Cola
Bottling Company, 53 Del. 477, 172 A.2d 252 (1961). A very recent Delaware superior court
decision appears to credit the Restatement formulation of strict liability with some legitimacy
but seems to view this doctrine as essentially the equivalent of the imminently dangerous exception
to the privity requirement of negligence and warranty actions. Kates v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.,
263 A.2d 308 (Super. Ct. 1970). The Delaware decisions have recognized both the imminently
dangerous and inherently dangerous product exceptions to the privity requirement. Behringer v.
William Gretz Brewing Co., 53 Del. 365, 169 A.2d 249 (1961). Privity is also required in a
breach of warranty action in this state. See Behinger v. William Gretz Brewing Co., supra. The
jurisdiction does not follow the food-and-beverage to the privity requirement.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Is a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. All privity requirements in
products liability actions were struck and strict liability imposed on sellers and manufacturers
alike in the very recent case Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Services, Inc., 262 A.2d 807 (1970).
FLORIDA-The Status of the Law As to Strict Liability is Preesntly in Doubt. The Florida
Supreme Court has never espoused the doctrine, but the Florida Court of Appeals for the Third
District recently rather casually applied the doctrine of strict tort liability (although it still ulti-
mately rendered judgment against the plaintiff). Royal v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., 203
So. 2d 307 (Fla. App. 1967). Florida courts have abolished privity as a necessity for maintaining an
action on an implied warranty in Continental Copper & Steel v. Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla.
App. 1958). The privity requirement in negligence actions was abolished in the case of William v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 149 So. 2d 898 (Fla. App. 1963); See also Green v. American Tobacco
Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1963).
GEORGIA Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit so held in Whitaker v. Harvel-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1969). This
jurisdiction had allowed an action based upon an implied warranty to be maintained in the absence
of privity between the plaintiff and the defendant. Wood v. Hubb Motor Co., 110 Ga. App. 101,
137 S.E.2d 674 (1964). An earlier Georgia decision indicated that the privity requirement no long-
er had vitality in that jurisdiction so far as liability based on a negligence theory was concerned.
Eades v. Spencer-Adams Paint Co., 82 Ga. App. 123, 60 S.E.2d 543 (1950).
HAWAII Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. Hawaii courts have held that privity is not
necessary in a suit based upon an implied warranty in product liability cases. Chapman v. Brown,
198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962).
IDAHO Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. Privity has been required in a product caused
injury case based upon a negligence theory in Idaho. However, the standard imminently dangerous
and inherently dangerous products exceptions to the privity requirement are recognized. Aber-
crombie v. Union Portland Cement Co., 35 Idaho 231, 205 P. 1118 (1922). Probably the food
and beverage exception to the privity requirement is also followed in this jurisdiction, although no
cases directly in point have been reported.
ILLINOIS Is A Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court in a recent case of
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.W. 182 (1965), has adopted the strict liability
in tort doctrine imposing liability without fault upon the manufacturer. See also Wright v. Massey-
Harris, 68 I11. App. 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966); People ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Bua,
37 Ill. 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967); Fanning v. LeMay, 38 I11. 2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182 (1967);
Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 Ill. App. 6, 236 N.E.2d 439 (1968); Wallinger v. Martin Stamping &
Stove Co., 93 Ill. App. 437, 236 N.E.2d 755 (1968); Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell, 42 Ill. 2d
339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
INDIANA Is A Strict Liability Jurisdiction. Both the imminently dangerous and inherently
dangerous product exceptions to the privity requirements in the suits based on a negligence theory
were recognized in this jurisdiction. Gaihmer v. Virginia Carolina Chemical Corp., 241 F.2d 836
(7th Cir. 1957); Holland Furnace Co. v. Nauracha, 105 Ind. App. 574, 14 N.E.2d 339 (1938).
The food and beverage exception to the privity requirement was also recognized in the Indiana
court. Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Williams, Ill Ind. App. 502, 37 N.E.2d 702 (1941). On
26 May 1970, however, an Indiana appellate court expressly adopted S 402A. Cornette v.
Searjeant Metal Products, Inc., 258 N.E.2d 652 (App. Ct. Ind. 1970).
Questions as to the law of this jurisdiction has been raised by two recent federal court decisions,
declaring the strict liability-in-tort doctrine applicable. Gagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344
F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965); Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
Both of these decisions noted and followed the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS 5 402A. The
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Indiana Supreme Court has never applied the strict doctrine of liability in tort, however.
IOWA Is a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Iowa for the first time ex-
pressly so held, embracing § 402A and the reasoning of several states, in Hawkeye-Security In-
surance Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (1970). The Iowa courts had previously waived
privity requirements for actions based on implied warranty in State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co. v. Anderson-Webber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961).
KANSAS Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The Kansas decisions recognize both the im-
minently dangerous and inherently dangerous product exceptions to the general rule of privity in
negligence actions. Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1950); Stevens
v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151 Kansas 638, 100 P.2d 723 (1940). Kansas also supports the view
that privity is not required in a negligence action for injury caused by an unwholesome food
product. Parks v. T. C. Yost Tie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 P. 202 (1914). Kansas courts have ruled
that privity is not required in an action to recover for breach of an implied warranty where the
warranty is "imposed by law" as a matter of public policy. Rupp v. Norton Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 187 Kan. 390, 357 P.2d 802 (1960). This seems to be, however, merely an extension of
the food-and-beverage or intimate bodily use exception to the privity requirement, and not a gen-
eral holding that a suit based on an implied warranty may be maintained in the absence of privity.
KENTUCKY Is a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. Kentucky courts have repudiated the general
rule of manufacturers' non-liability for negligence in the absence of privity. C. D. Herme, Inc. v.
Tway Co., 294 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1956). More recently the Kentucky court of appeals has held that
privity is not a pre-requisite to maintenance of an action for breach of an implied warranty in
product liability cases, the court accepting the reasoning enunciated in Henningson v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 68, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). The Kentucky decision is Dealers Transport Co.,
Inc. v. Battery Distributing Co., Inc., CCH Products Liability Rptr. § 5406 (Ky. App. June 4,
1965), and in a modified opinion delivered May 13, 1966, CCH Products Liability Rptr. § 5562
(Ky. App. 1966), the Kentucky court of appeals embraced an implied strict liability in tort.
See also Allen v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 403 S.W.2d 20 (Ky. 1966) and Kroeger v. Bowman, 411
S.W.2d 339 (1967).
LOUISIANA Is a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. However, the formulation of the strict liability
doctrine by the Louisiana Courts is somewhat unique. They extend strict liability if the user is
without fault (a typical element of the strict liability of cause of action) and if the kind of injury
sustained could reasonably have been an anticipated result of the established defect. Meche v.
Farmers Dryer & Storage Co., 193 So. 2d 807 (La. App. 1967); Arnold v. U. S. Rubber, 203 So. 2d
764 (La. App. 1967). See also Dean v. General Motors Corp., 301 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. La. 1969)
(applying Louisiana law) and Soileau v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 302 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1969).
The Louisiana decisions have supported the inherently dangerous and imminently dangerous
product exceptions to the privity requirements. Frazer v. Ayres, 27 So. 2d 754 (La. App. 1945);
Moore v. Jefferson Distilling and Denaturing Co., 169 La. 1156, 126 So. 691 (1930). The food
and beverage exception to the privity requirements has also been recognized in this jurisdiction.
Auzenne v. Gulf Public Service Co., 181 So. 54 (La. App. 1938); Lartigue v. F. J. Reynolds To-
bacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963). In breach of warranty cases the Louisiana courts have
held privity indispensable to recovery. Strother v. Villere Coal Co., 15 So. 2d 383 (La. App. 1954).
MAINE Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. In products liability cases based on negligence,
the Maine courts adhere to the privity requirement drawing exceptions thereto in cases involving
injuries caused by inherently dangerous products and unwholesome food products. Pelletier v.
DuPont, 124 Me. 269, 128 A. 186 (1925); Flaherity v. Helfont, 123 Me. 134, 122 A. 180 (1923).
The Maine courts also require privity on breach of warranty cases. See Pelletier, supra.
MARYLAND Is Not Yet a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. However, the court of appeals of
Maryland has twice discussed the subject of strict liability and refrained from espousing the doc-
trine only because it did not properly apply to the presented facts. The court has not criticized
the doctrine and appears ready to embrace it at such time as an appropriate context arises. Telak
v. Maszczenski, 248 Md. 476, 237 A.2d 434 (1968); Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253
Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855 (1965).
There is authority in Maryland that the privity requirement is not applicable in negligence
suits against manufacturers or sellers or products allegedly causing injury. See Babylon v. Scruton,
215 Md. 299, 138 A.2d 375 (1958). The law has not been clear as to this point, however, since
other authority has indicated that the state embraces the imminently dangerous and inherently
dangerous product exceptions to the privity requirement. Especo Distilling Corp. v. Owing Mills
Distillery, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 380 (D. Md. 1942). Privity is still required in actions based upon
breach of warranty. Popal v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 180 Md. 389, 24 A.2d 783 (1942).
MASSACHUSETTS Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. This jurisdiction in Carter v. Yard-
ley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946), repudiated the privity requirement in all negli-
gence actions in that jurisdiction. An injured plaintiff must no longer show that he comes within
one of the recognized exceptions to the privity requirement when his action is based upon negligence
theory. Massachusetts courts still require privity, however, in breach of warranty cases. Kennedy
v. Brockelman Bros., Inc., 334 Mass. 225, 134 N.E.2d 747 (1956); Jacquot v. William Filene's
Sons Co., 337 Mass. 312, 149 N.E.2d 635 (1958).
MICHIGAN Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. Michigan has abandoned the privity rule
in negligence actions growing out of product caused injuries. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders &
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Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958). The Michigan decision also holds
that privity is not required in actions based upon breach of an implied warranty. See Spence v.
Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., supra; Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868
(7th Cir. 1960). The courts have held that privity is not required in actions based upon breach
of implied warranty. Hills v. Harbor Steel & Supply Corp., 374 Mich. 194, 132 N.W.2d 54 (1965);
Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
MINNESOTA Is a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The Minnesota Supreme Court has now adopt-
ed specifically and completely the doctrine of strict liability in tort expressed in § 402A. In
MacCormack v. Handscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967), the court reviewed its past partial en-
croachments on strict liability and the growing trend for this doctrine and ruled that Minnesota
would follow it as well, based on "sound public policy consideration." See also Kerr v. Corning
Glass Works, 169 N.W.2d 587 (1969). In Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 171 N.W.2d 201 (1969),
the court affirmed strict liability theory but held that awareness of the defect by the user fore-
closes strict liability recovery.
MISSISSIPPI Is a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Mississippi expressly over-
ruled prior cases which required privity between a consumer and manufacturer to sustain a suit
by the former against the latter, and embraced § 402A of the Restatement in State Stove Mfg.
Co. v. Hodges, 180 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966). See also Ford Motor Co. v. Dees, 223 So. 2d 638
(Miss. 1969); Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969).
MISSOURI Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. However, the Missouri Courts do allow an
action based on an implied warranty of fitness in the absence of privity. Morrow v. Wolerac Appli-
ance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963); Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 411 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. 1966);
Ross v. Phillip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964). Earlier decisions have supported both
the inherently dangerous and the imminently dangerous product exceptions to privity requirement
as well as food and beverage exceptions. The supreme court in Stevens v. Durbin-Burco, Inc., 377
S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1964) indicates that there is still a priivty requirement in negligence cases in this
jurisdiction unless the plaintiff can show he comes within one of the recognized exceptions. Re-
cently, a federal court in Missouri has predicted in Hacker v. Rector, 250 F. Supp. 300 (W.D. Mo.
1966), that the Supreme Court of Missouri will expressly adopt strict liability as defined it § 402A
of the Restatement, but the prophesy has not yet been fulfilled.
MONTANA Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. Montana is among the majority jurisdiction
iu requiring privity in suits based on warranty (express or implied) and in suits based on the
negligence of the manufacturer or the seller. The standard imminently dangerous product excep-
tion is recognized. Larson v. U. S. Rubber, 163 F. Supp. 327 (D. Mont. 1958). The food exception
has also been long accepted, allowing recovery on a strict liability theory. Skelly v. John R. Daily
Co., 56 Mont. 63, 181 P. 326 (1919); Bolitho v. Safeway Stores, 109 Mont. 213, 95 P.2d 443
(1938). Recently this exception was extended to drugs by the Court of Appeals for tle Ninth
Circuit in Davis v. Weth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
NEBRASKA Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. Nebraska courts apply the general rule
that privity is a pre-requisite to recovery in a suit based upon an express or implied warranty but
recognize the imminently dangerous and inherently dangerous product exceptions to the privity
requirements. Rose v. Buffalo Air Service, 170 Neb. 806, 104 N.W.2d 431 (1960); Colvin v.
John Powell & Co., Inc., 1963 Neb. 112, 77 N.W.2d 900 (1956). Nebraska cases also set forth
the food-and-beverage exception to the privity requirements, allowing recovery on an implied
warranty theory. Asher v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 172 Neb. 855, 112 N.W.2d 252 (1961).
NEVADA Is Not a Strict Liability jurisdiction. Strict liability in tort has been rejected in
Nevada. Long v. Flannagan Warehouse Co., 79 Nev. 241, 382 P.2d 399 (1963). However, the
Nevada Supreme Court has applied strict liability to the manufacture of a bottled beverage, and
in that instance seemed to be moved by the broad appeal of strict liability doctrine generally.
Shoshone Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 420 P.2d 855 (1966). Hence, perhaps
the Nevada courts may soon apply the doctrine more liberally. Nevada permits recovery for
negligence in an exceptional instance of imminently dangerous products. Cosgriff Neon Co. V.
Mattheus, 78 Nev. 281, 371 P.2d 819 (1962).
NEW HAMPSHIRE Is a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire
has recently adopted the doctrine of strict liability in tort in the area of products liability, citing
the cases of several states and the Restatement. Elliott v. LaChance, 109 N.H. 481, 256 A.2d 153
(1969); Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 260 A.2d 111 (N.H. 1969).
NEW JERSEY Is a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. New Jersey is the home of one of the leading
cases in the strict liability field. Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1969). See also Rosenau v. City of New Prospect, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968); Neward
v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1960). The courts in this state have eliminated the
requirement of privity in the product-caused injury cases and have gone on so far as to hold
that the Henningson principles (no need for privity) were equally applicable where no personal
injury had occurred and the sole claim was to recover the price paid for a defectively manufac-
tured rug. Santor v. A & M Karagheusien, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). Contributory
negligence, however, had been established to avail a defense to actions for strict liability. Maiorino
v. Weco Products, 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965); Cintrone v. Hartz, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d
769 (1965).
NEW MEXICO Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The strict doctrine liability was im-
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pliedly rejected in the case of Phares v. Sandia Lumber Co., 62 N.M. 90, 305 P.2d 367 (1956).
Subsequent products liability cases in this jurisdiction have proceeded as warranty actions. Massey
v. Beacon Supply Co., 70 N.M. 149, 371 P.2d 798 (1962); Vitro Corp. of America v. Texas
Vitrified Supply Co., 71 N.M. 95, 376 P.2d 41 (1962). However, apparently no products liability
cases have arisen before the supreme court of New Mexico in the past eight years. This jurisdiction
requires privity and product-caused injury cases and recognizes both the imminently and inherently
dangerous product exceptions to the privity requirement. Wood v. Sloan, 20 N.M. 127, 148 P.
507 (1915). The food and beverage exception to the privity requirement is also followed. Tafoya
v. Las Cruces Coca Cola Bottling Co., 59 N.M. 43, 278 P.2d 575 (1955).
NEW YORK Is a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The doctrine of strict liability has been em-
braced in New York. Goldberg v. Colsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81
(1963). However, the strict liability action is not available to bystanders, since they are not con-
templated users. Berzon v. Don Allen Motors, Inc., 23 N.Y. App. Div. 2d 530, 256 N.Y.S.2d
643 (1965).
Earlier, New York had permitted recovery for express warranty without privity. Randy Knit
Wear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
Further, it permitted recovery upon the basis of implied warranty without privity as to some
classes of plaintiffs. Thomas v. Leary, 15 App. Div. 2d 438, 225 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1962). The food
and beverage exception to the general privity requirement had also been applied in New York.
Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
NORTH CAROLINA Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. North Carolina follows the rule
requiring privity of contract between a manufacturer or seller in a party with a product-caused
injury. The standard imminently and inherently dangerous product exceptions to the privity re-
quirement are recognized in this jurisdiction. Tyson v. Long Mfg. Co., Inc., 249 N.C. 557, 107
S.E.2d 170 (1959), and Gwyn v. Lucky City Motors, Inc., 252 N.C. 123, 113 S.E.2d 302 (1960).
A recent North Carolina case has held that privity is even required in food and beverage cases.
Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 263 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753 (1964).
NORTH DAKOTA Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. A recent North Dakota Supreme
Court decision held that a plaintiff in a product liability case may maintain an action against the
manufacturer based upon an implied warranty in the absence of privity. Lang v. General Motors
Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965). The decision also eliminates the privity requirement in
negligence actions.
OHIO Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. Before the recent case of Lonzrick v. The Re-
public Steel Corp., 1 Ohio 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92 (1965), the courts of this jurisdiction had
held an insured plaintiff in a products liability case could maintain an action based upon an express
warranty without the showing of privity. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio 244,
147 N.E.2d 612 (1958). The Lonzrick opinion of the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County ad-
hered to the strict liability in tort doctrine. In a 4-3 decision announced June 15, 1966, Lonzrick
v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966), the Supreme Court of Ohio
affirmed the court of appeals, but even the slender majority of supreme court did not expressly
approve the doctrine of strict liability in tort. Instead, the supreme court majority based its de-
cision upon the application of tort liability for implied warranty without privity. No subsequent
cases have resurrected the issue.
Earlier Ohio cases based on a negligence theory require either privity or showing of the plain-
tiff's counts in one of the recognized exceptions, such as the imminently and inherently dangerous
product exceptions. White Sewing Machine Co. v. Feisel, 28 Ohio App. 152, 162 N.E. 633
(1927); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 94 Ohio Law Abs. 438, 197 N.E.2d 921 (Ohio App.
1964). Ohio cases also support the food and beverage exception to the privity rule. Ward Baking
Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928). The courts have also required privity
on suits based on implied warranty. Wood v. General Electric Co., 159 Ohio State 273, 112 N.E.2d
8 (1953); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., supra.
OKLAHOMA Is a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has recently
approved application of the doctrine of strict liability in tort to a manufacturer. Marathon Battery
Co. v. Kilpatrick, CCH Prod. Lia. Rep. 5501 (1965). Earlier, the Oklahoma courts held that
privity was not essential to recovery in a negligence action growing out of a product-caused injury
where the product in question was either imminently or inherently dangerous. Crane Co. v. Sears,
168 Okla. 603, 35 P.2d 916 (1934); Gosnell v. Zink, 325 P.2d 965 (Okla. 1958). The standard
food and beverage exception to the privity requirement was also recognized. Cook v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 330 P.2d 375 (Okla. 1958).
OREGON Is a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. Previously, this jurisdiction had recognized the
requirement of privity in negligence actions between the consumer and the manufacturer and also
the standard exceptons to the privity requirement such as the imminently or inherently dangerous
product exceptions. Stout v. Madden, 208 Oreg. 294, 300 P.2d 461 (1956); Wights v. Staff Jen-
nings, Inc., 405 P.2d 624 (Ore. 1965). While in Wights, the Supreme Court of Oregon, in dicta, ex-
plicitly rejected strict liability theory as "proving too much," it expressly adopted and applied
the RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 402A view in Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Oregon 467, 435 P.2d
806 (1967). See also State ex rel Western Seed Production Corp. v. Campbell, 250 Ore. 262, 442
P.2d 215 (1968). A federal district court decision, applying Oregon law, has even awarded strict
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liability recovery for loss of property where the manufacturer and purchaser were in privity, in
Arrow Transportation Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 289 F. Supp. 170 (D. Ore. 1968).
PENNSYLVANIA Is a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The state of Pennsylvania adopted Sec.
tion 402A of the Restatement explicitly, quoting the language of that section in the opinion, in
Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). Thus, the Pennsylvania courts have codified
their previous adoptions of individual elements of the concept of strict liability in tort as ex-
pressed in cases such as Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963) in
Caski v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 373 Pa. 614, 96 A.2d 901 (1953). Voluntary use of a product
known to be dangerous by the plaintiff has been recognized as a complete defense to strict liability.
Feraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966). For cases applying strict liability
to sellers and distributors see Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 428 Pa. 334, 237 A.2d 593 (1968); and
LaGorga v. Kroger, 275 F. Supp. 373 (1967).
RHODE ISLAND-The Status of the Law in Rhode Island relative to Strict Tort Liability
is Presently in Doubt. A federal district court recently felt free to mold its own policy on the
question and applied § 402A of the Restatement-predicting that the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island would do likewise if faced with a proper case. Klimos v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.,
297 F. Supp. 937 (O.R.I. 1969). The courts of Rhode Island have followed the rule requiring priv-
ity of contract between an injured plaintiff and a manufacturer or a seller in an action for product-
caused injury, recognizing, however, the standard imminently and inherently dangerous products
exceptions to the privity requirements. S. C. Johnson & Co., Inc. v. Palieri, 260 F.2d 88 (1st
Cir. 1958); Collett v. Page, 44 R.I. 26, 114 A. 135 (1921). This state has abolished the privity
requirement in the food and beverage cases by statute. R. I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 2-315 (1960).
Before this statute, the Rhode Island courts had held that, even in the food and beverage
cases, an injured plaintiff could not maintain an action aaginst the manufacturer without alleging
privity. Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Co., 83 R.I. 51, 112 A.2d 701 (1955).
SOUTH CAROLINA Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The South Carolina decisions es-
tablish a requirement of privity in negligence actions arising out of product-caused injury cases,
and it also recognizes imminently and inherently dangerous product exceptions to the privity
requirement. When a suit is based on either an express or implied warranty, this jurisdiction
requires privity between the plaintiff and the manufacturer. Odom v. Ford Motor Co., 230 S.C.
320, 95 S.E.2d 601 (1956); Beasley v. Ford Motor Co., 237 S.C. 506, 117 S.E.2d 863 (1961).
The South Carolina decisions also support the food and beverage exceptions to the privity require-
ment. Tate v. Mauldin, 156 S.C. 392, 154 S.E. 431 (1930). A federal district court, applying
South Carolina law, recently felt justified in generally banning the privity requirement in product
liability actions in tort. Hughes v. Kaiser Jeep, 40 F.R.D. 89 (1966).
SOUTH DAKOTA Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. While the body of product liability
law in this jurisdiction is not great, the cases support the privity requirement and recognize the
imminently and inherently dangerous product exceptions to the privity requirement in negligence
cases. Whitehorn v. Nash-Finch Co., 67 S.D. 465, 293 N.W. 859 (1940); Gustafson v. Gate City
Coop. Creamery, 80 S.D. 430, 126 N.W.2d 121 (1964). This state also adheres to the standard
food and beverage exception to the privity requirement. Whitehorn v. Nash-Finch Co., supra. A
federal court, applying South Dakota law, recently speculated that the South Dakota Supreme Court
would turn to the Restatement should the topic of strict liability arise. Yarrow v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159 (D.S.D. 1967). However, in that case the products involved were drugs,
and hence the factual context of the decision could possibly be absorbed within the food and bev-
erage exception to the privity requirement.
TENNESSEE Is a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Tennessee first indi-
cated, in ditca, a favorable inclination toward the doctrine of strict products liability in Ford Motor
Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966). Later, a federal district court cataloged a buyer's
potential grounds for recovery against a manufacturer as:
(a) negligence;
(b) breach of warranty, with privity;
(c) breach of implied warranty without privity (under UCC)
(d) misrepresentation; and
(e) strici liability.
The federal court felt convinced that the dicta of Lonon would be applied in future decisions.
Leev. Sears Roebuck & Co., 262 F. Supp. 232 (E.D. Tenn. 1966). The Supreme Court of Tennes-
see made good its prediction holding for the plaintiff on the grounds of strict liability as outlined
in § 402A of the Restatement in Olney v. Beamon Bottling Co., 418 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1967).
TEXAS Is a Strict Liability Jierisdiction. The Texas courts adopted 'S 402A of 'the Re-
statement explicitly in the case of McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d'787 (Tex. 1967).
However, on the same date this decision was rendered, the high court in Texas ruled that in the
'strict liability context, the plaintiff cannot recover where he persists in the use of the product
knowing that it is dangerous. Since McKisson, a whole rash of appellate and federal cases have
applied the doctrine. See, e.g., 0. M. Franklin Serum Co. v. C. A. Hoover & Son, 418 S.W.2d
482 (Tex. 1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Darryl, 432 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Pittsburgh
Coca Cola Bottling Works of Pittsburgh v. Ponder, 443 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1969); Curtis Industries
v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967); Olsen v. Royal Metals Corp., 392 F.2d 111 (5th Cir.
1968); Ross v. Upright, Inc., 402 F.2d .943 (5th Cir. 1968).
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UTAH Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. Utah stands with those states requiring privity
between the manufacturer or seller and the injured plaintiff in both suits based upon a warranty
and upon a negligence theory, while also recognizing the imminently and inherently dangerous
product exceptions to the privity requirement. Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 123 Utah 515,
216 P.2d 549 (1953); Hewitt v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 3 Utah 2d 353, 284 P.2d 471
(1955). Support is also to be found in the Utah decisions for an exception to the privity require-
ment in cases of injury caused by unwholesome food products. Schneider v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d
35, 327 P.2d 822 (1958).
VERMONT-The Status of the Law as to Strict Liability in Vermont is Presently in Doubt.
The Vermont state courts have not recently dealt with the question of privity of contract in
warranty or negligent cases. In fact, no case has been found supporting the standard food and
beverage exceptions or even inherently or imminently dangerous exceptions to the privity rule. In
a recent federal court decision, a suit based upon an implied warranty in the absence of privity
was allowed against a manufacturer. Deveny v. Rheem Taxi Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963).
VIRGINIA Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. Virginia has enacted a statute which elimi-
nates the requirement of privity in actions based upon warranty or upon negligence. VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-654.3 (Supp. 1962), re-enacted as VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965). This jurisdiction
allowed a suit based upon an implied warranty without the need of showing privity between the
injured plaintiff and the manufacturer or seller. Virginia has standard exceptions to the privity re-
quirements, i.e., the imminently dangerous, inherently dangerous, and food and beverage exceptions
to the privity requirement. Harris v. Hampton Roads Tractor & Equipment Co., 202 Va. 958,
121 S.E.2d 471 (1961). The Virginia courts have not accepted the strict liability doctrine in Hen-
ningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), but have actually rejected
the Henningson case. See Harris, supra.
WASHINGTON Is a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. The State of Washington recently joined
the trend toward explicit adoption of § 402A of the Restatement. In Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co.,
452 P.2d 729 (1969) the court adopted the doctrine but specifically limited it to actions against
manufacturers. Application to other sellers was preserved for subsequent consideration. Proof that
that injured user of the defective product voluntarily and unreasonably encountered an obvious
danger has been recognized as a complete defense available to a defendant manufacturer. Brown
v. Quick Mix Co., 454 P.2d 205 (Wash. 1969).
WEST VIRGINIA Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. West Virginia has held that there
must be privity between one seeking recovery for a product-caused injury on the ground of negli-
gence and the manufacturer or seller of the product from whom recovery is sought in the absence
of one of the recognized exceptions to the privity rule. Roush v. Johnson, 139 W. Va. 607, 80
S.E.2d 857 (1954). The jurisdiction also recognizes the food and beverage exception to the privity
requirement. Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 121 W. Va. 115, 2 S.E.2d 898 (1939).
In West Virginia, there must be privity of contract between an injured plaintiff and a manu-
facturer where the plaintiff seeks to impose liability upon the manufacturer on the basis of an
express or implied warranty. Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Market, 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 75 (1939).
The West Virginia decisions nowhere mention the strict liability doctrine, and one recent case
has even questioned the existence of the standard exceptions to the privity requirements in negli-
gence actions in that state. Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 137 S.E.2d 225 (W. Va. 1964).
WISCONSIN Is a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. Privity requirements in all product liability
cases were banned and the strict liability doctrine aodpted by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
in Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). The assault upon privity require-
ments was actually initiated in the earlier case of Smith v. Atco Co., 6 Wis. 2d 371, 94 N.W.2d
697 (1959), but in that case privity was still an acknowledged element of breach of warranty
actions.
WYOMING Is Not a Strict Liability Jurisdiction. While there is a paucity of product lia-
bility in this jurisdiction, the more recent cases indicate that Wyoming has adopted the inherently
dangerous product exception to the prvity requirement but requires privity between a consumer
and a manufacturer in other cases based upon theories of either warranty or negligence. Parker v.
Heasler Plumbing & Heating Co., 388 P.2d 516 (1964). While no case law could be found on
the subject, a recent amendment to the warranty section of the Uniform Commercial Code in
this jurisdiction would seem to indicate that :Wyoming will allow a suit based upon an implied
warranty without the showing of privity.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:
It can be noted generally that in the near future, as cases arise involving incidents occurring
after the date of adoption of the UCC, the abolition of the privity requirement in an action based
upon the implied warranty of merchantability will become virtually universal (UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 2-314), since all states but Louisiana have already adopted the code-and Louisiana is
already a strict liability state. The distinction between this, when it is applicable under UCC defi-
nitions, and strict liability theory is more conceptual than pragmatically real.
Also to be observed is the highly dynamic- nature of the current trend toward acceptance of
strict tort liability doctrine. Virtually no state's supreme court has confronted and rejected this
theory within the past 4 years, yet in that time at least 13 states have freshly acceped it. The
courts of 4 to 5 other states have indicated noncommital approval.
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that the manufacturer or seller may be liable even though there is no
"defect" in the product, if it is likely to cause injury when used within
the range of ordinarily anticipated uses and the manufacturer or seller
does not give the user notice of this fact."
This effectively serves to remove the burden of proving the defendant's
negligence from the shoulders of the plaintiff, the rationale being that
the unparalleled complexities of the end product of American industrial
ingenuity places an insuperable burden upon the plaintiff in ferreting
out the existing negligence. As Professor William Prosser pointed out
in "The Assault Upon The Citadel," "An honest estimate might very
well be that there is not one case in a hundred in which strict liability
would result in recovery where negligence does not."'7 As noted before,
in a negligence action brought against the manufacturer the plaintiff
must prove first, that the injury was caused by a defect in the product
and second, that the defeat existed when the product left the hands
of the defendant. In neither of these instances does strict liability in
tort serve to aid him in any way whatsoever. "It cannot prove causa-
tion; and it cannot trace the cause to the defendant."' As Professor
Prosser notes, if the plaintiff is able to establish these two points, his only
remaining task is that of proving the defendant manufacturer's negli-
gence. "This is by far the easiest of the three and it is one in which the
plaintiff almost never fails.""
Professor Prosser goes on to say in this article that although the plain-
tiff has the burden of proof on the issue of negligence in almost every
jurisdiction, he is aided by the very liberally construed doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur,"° or its practical equivalent." In all jurisdictions, this gives
"Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., Inc., Docket No. 41425 (111. Sup. Ct. filed, November 1969).
3769 YALE L.J. 1099, at 1114 (1960).
8 Id.
9 Id.
40The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was first applied in Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299
(Ex. 1863). The application of the doctrine is limited by certain well settled principles. The event
involved: (1) must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's
negligence; (2) must not be caused by an instrumentality or agency within the exclusive control
of the dependent; (3) must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the plaintiff. It is held in a majority of the states that the doctrine does not apply where
common knowledge or experience is not sufficiently extensive to permit it to be said that the plain-
tiff's condition would not have existed but for the negligence of the defendants. Ayers v. Parry,
192 F.2d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1951). An example of the doctrine can be seen in Fehrman v. Smirl,
20 Wis. 2d 1, 121 N.W.2d 255 (1963). There the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated that the
question of negligence in the case "did not lie within the field of common knowledge of layman,"
but went on to hold that a res ipsa loquitur instruction to the jury could be supported on the
basis of expert medical testimony given into evidence at the trial.
41 For liberal construction of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, see Richenbacher v. California
Packing Corp., 250 Mass. 198, 145 N.E. 281 (1924); Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal.
2d 33, 77 P.2d 833 (1938); Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Creech, 245 Ky. 414, 53 S.W.2d 745
(1932); Cassini v. Curtis Candy Co., 113 N.J.L. 91, 172 A. 519 (1934); Gross v. Loft, Inc.,
121 Conn. 394, 185 A. 80 (1936); Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 54, 203 P.2d 522
(1949); De Pale v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 25 F. Supp. 1006 (1939), aff'd, 109 F.2d 598
(3d Cir. 1940); Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Davidson, 193 Ark. 825, 102 S.W.2d 833 (1937);
Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918); Quinn v. Swift & Co.,
20 F. Supp. 234 (M.D. Pa. 1937); Bissonnette v. National Biscuit Co., 100 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir.
1939); De Groat v. Ward Baking Co., 102 N.J.L. 188, 130 A. 540 (1925).
Pennsylvania achieves the same result through the use of a practical equivalent of res ipsa
loquitur denominated as "exclusive control." Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953).
Circumstantial evidence has been used to achieve the same result. North American Aviation v.
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rise to a permissible inference of the defendant manufacturer's negligence
and serves very handily to get the plaintiff to the jury. "Once the cause
of the harm is layed at the doorstep a jury verdict for the defendant on
the negligence issue is virtually unknown."' The question can reasonably
be asked then, why does the plaintiff's attorney clamor so loudly for the
cause of strict liability in tort? The answer is quite simple, for as long
as the negligence issue remains a factor in the case, it must be litigated
and the plaintiff's counsel must prepare himself to examine and cross-
examine witnesses and defendant's experts.' As long as the possibility
exists that negligence may not be found, plaintiff's counsel must face
the rather dim prospect that the case can conceivably be decided for the
defendant. A case which can be so decided is worthless in terms of settle-
ment and one in which settlement is difficult to accomplish." Therefore,
if the defendant is able to introduce evidence as to his own due care,
the possibility must remain that it can influence not only the size of the
verdict but that it could conceivably affect the jury to the extent that it
will hold for the defendant manufacturer. Strict tort liability, therefore,
serves the plaintiff's counsel as a tool of intimidation, a tool which they
have wielded with considerable deftness during the past decade, but one
which can be blunted by a creative defense.
III. CURRENT TRENDS IN AVIATION PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Aircraft manufacturers, not unlike manufacturers of the television
sets and automobiles I spoke of briefly before, are subject to the same
liability for violation of this duty to exercise reasonable care in the
manufacture of their products. They may be held liable for their negli-
gence,' for breach of express48 or implied warranty' and as is befitting
the current trend, liable under the doctrine of strict liability in tort."
The aircraft manufacturer may be held liable for negligently designing
his aircraft" or negligence in the fabrication of the final product."0
Further, he can find himself liable for failure to warn users of the air-
craft of what may be considered dangerous propensities, and this duty
continues long after the aircraft is sold." It is no longer enough that the
manufacturer of the aircraft meets the standards of the industry, it is
further required that he meet a standard of due care under the circum-
Hughes, 247 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 914 (1958); Lajoie v. Bilodeau, 148
Me. 359,, 93 A.2d 719 (1953); Merchant v. Columbia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 214 S.C. 206, 51
S.E.2d 749 (1949). See also Indiana Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Matthew Stores, Inc., 349
Mich. 441, 84 N.W.2d 755 (1957).
42 6 9 YALE L.J. 1099, at 1115 (1960).
'Id. at 1116.
44 Id.
' North American Aviation v. Hughes, 247 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1957); Carter Carburetor
Corp. v. Riley, 186 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1951).
"Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954).
47
Krause v. Sud Aviation, 301 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
48 Rossignal v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 227 A.2d 418 (1967).
41 Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 18 F.2d 169 (1955); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L.
Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956).
"°See Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961).
" Devito v. United Airlines, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
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stances in which his particular product will be utilized." This, when the
disastrous consequences of a failure of his product are looked to, is a high
standard of care indeed.
In this country a very special legal problem exists, with reference
specifically to the system of governmental supervision through a certifica-
tion process by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) of all civil air-
craft licensed to fly. 3 It is a problem which has been given relatively little
attention and one when considered in depth, holds out some promise of
relief to the aircraft manufacturer. Therefore, it would behoove us to
give some special consideration to the question of whether the United
States Government can be held liable, by virtue of this certification, in a
products liability action brought against an aircraft manufacturer. Fur-
ther, whether or not manufacturers are relieved either of all of their
liability for a defect or perhaps a portion of it by virtue of this increas-
ingly and ever-growing large Government supervisory role.
Another problem of equally large proportions is the very unusual and
difficult problems in conflicts of law presented to aircraft manufacturers
in product liability cases. It is not at all unusual for an aircraft to be
manufactured in Kansas from parts that were manufacturer by sub-
contractors in five or six other states, sold to a dealer in Florida, pur-
chased by a gentleman who lives in Texas, and have the aircraft crash
in the middle of a navigable body of water that divides two other states.
Further, the manufacturer may be sued in still another state, which may
be its state of incorporation, or one in which it does a considerable por-
tion of its business. Thus, it can be said without fear of contradiction that
the applicable laws pertaining to negligence, contracts, breach of war-
ranty, privity, statutes of limitations and damages may be extremely
difficult to resolve, even after the pieces of the puzzle have been placed
in some semblance of order.
The authority under which newly constructed civil aircraft are cer-
tificated in the United States today is the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,5
which for all intensive purposes is identical to its predecessor, the Civil
Aeronautics Act.' Therein it is provided that:
[T]he Administrator is empowered, and it shall be his duty to promote
safety of flight of covil aircraft in the air commerce by prescribing and re
vising from time to time:
(1) Such minimum standards governing the design, materials, workmanship,
construction and performance of the aircraft, aircraft engines and propellers,
as may be required in the interests of safety. [Emphasis added.].
(2) Such minimum standards governing appliances as may be required in the
interest of safety."0 [Emphasis added.].
Section 603A of the Act provides:
3See Comment, Tort Liability of Manufacturers and Vendors Aviation Products, 1953 Wis-
CONSIN L. REV. 109.
13 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1958).
54 Id.
55 52 Stat. 1007 (1938).
56 Id.
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(1) [Tlhe Administrator is empowered to issue type certificates for aircraft,
aircraft engines and propellers; to specify in regulations the applicances for
which the issuance of type certificates is reasonably required in the interests of
safety; and to issue such certificates for appliances so specified. [Emphasis
added. ].
(2) Any interested person may file with the Administrator an application
for a type certificate for aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance
specified in regulations under paragraph [1] of this subsection. Upon receipt
of application, the Administrator shall make an investigation thereof and
may hold hearings thereon. The Administrator shall make, or require the
applicant to make such tests during manufacture and upon completion as
the Administrator deems reasonably necessary in the interest of safety, in-
cluding flight tests and tests of raw materials or any part or appurtenance
to such aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance. If the Administra-
tor finds that such aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance is of proper
design, material, specification, construction, and performance for safe opera-
tion, and meets the minimum standards, rules and regulations prescribed by
the Administrator, he shall issue a type certificate thereof. The Administrator
may prescribe in any such certificate the duration thereof and such other
items, conditions and limitations as are required in the aircraft, aircraft
engines, or propellers, a numerical determination of all the essential factors
relative to the performance of the aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller, for
which the certificate is issued. [Emphasis added.].
Section 603 (c) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 provides:
(c) [T]he registered owner of any aircraft may file with the Administrator
application for an airworthiness certificate for such aircraft. If the Adminis-
trator finds that the aircraft conforms to the type certificate therefor, and
after inspection, that the aircraft is in condition for safe operation, he shall
issue an airworthy certificate. The Administrator may prescribe in such
certificate the duration of such certificate, the type of service for which the
aircraft may be used, and such other terms, conditions, and limitations as are
required in the interest of safety. Each certificate shall be registered by the
Administrator and shall set forth such information as the Administrator
may deem advisable. The certificate number, or such other individual desig-
nation as may be required by the Administrator, shall be displayed upon
each aircraft in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Administrator.
[Emphasis added.].
A careful examination of this legislation clearly indicates that although
it alludes to only minimum standards governing the design and construc-
tion of aircraft, it is quite explicit in its requirements for tests relating
to the entire aircraft; and these tests are to be such as to ensure be-
yond any question of doubt the aircraft's reliability and its safety. It,
therefore, becomes abundantly clear that the certification of an aircraft
is a very integral part of the manufacturing and utilization of aircraft in
the United States, and that without such certification, the manufacturer
may not sell and the operator may not fly an aircraft. Since the certifica-
tion process is such an integral part of the design and construction of civil
aircraft, it is an area with which the aviation lawyer must be familiar if
he is to effectively prosecute or defend an aircraft products liability suit.
The certification process itself consists of an award, by the FAA, to the
manufacturer of an aircraft or of a component part, of a "type certificate"
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which attests to the safety of its design. An "airworthiness certificate" is
also issued which attests to the airworthiness and safety of the particular
aircraft certified.
The type certificate states, in essence, that the aircraft's design is
sound, and that its handling characteristics within the tested flight regimes
indicate it is an aircraft which will operate safely. It further states that
the aircraft complies with the minimum requirements of the FAA regu-
lations as propounded by the Federal Aviation Act of 19 5 8.
The aircraft manufacturer obtains approval for its particular aircraft
by submitting an application, for a type certificate, and extensive data
relating to the basic design, engineering studies, and flight test reports,
to the FAA. The FAA then conducts its own tests and reviews all of the
information provided by the manufacturer. In this evaluation process,
the FAA may suggest changes in the design to effect what it considers
more desirable or safer handling characteristics of the aircraft in question. 7
Such suggested changes are thoroughly discussed with the manufacturer,
and often lead to modifications since the manufacturer must satisfy the
FAA if he is to obtain the type certification for his aircraft.
In some instances, manufacturers of small aircraft may make applica-
tion to the administrator to have the burden of examination and testing
shifted to a properly qualified private person, denominated as a designated
manufacturer's certification representative (DMCR)." Such a person must
hold a position of some responsibility in the manufacturer's organization
with specific respect to the design and manufacture of the aircraft, and
must have been issued a certificate of designation by the Federal Avia-
tion Administrator. Qualification under this delegation option procedure
can only be accomplished if the manufacturer possesses a type certificate
and production certificate and further, employs a competent staff of engi-
neering, flight test production and inspection personnel, deemed adequate
to maintain compliance with all of the applicable FAA certification re-
quirements.
The FAA, however, does not completely vacate the field. The actual
certification is still scrutinized and they continue to inspect the aircraft
manufacturer's engine operation on a periodic basis. Further, the criteria
used by the DMCR to determine the particular fitness of the design and
airworthiness, must all be approved by the FAA, and they may also verify
compliance and participate in any or all test programs. The type certificate
itself, for the particular aircraft, is issued by the Administrator upon
application and statement of compliance submitted by the DMCR. Once
a type certificate has been issued, the DMCR may personally issue air-
worthiness certificates for a particular aircraft that he feels conforms to
the type design and that is in safe operating condition. The Federal Avi-
ation Administrator may, of course, at any time withdraw the manu-
facturer's privileges with respect to the DMCR if it feels that the manu-
facturer has failed to comply with the FAA requirements of procedure.
57 14 C.F.R. § 406.14(a) (Revised 1961).
58 14 C.F.R. § 410.2 (Revised 1961).
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Besides the designation option procedures afforded manufacturers of
small aircraft, there are also provisions for the designation of engineer-
ing representatives. A designated engineering representative (DER) 5 may
approve engineering data and other considerations within his designated
field. The designations issued by the FAA are flight analyst, flight test
pilot, structural engineering, power engineering, power plant engineering,
radio engineering, propeller engineering and systems and equipment engi-
neering. °
Perhaps the first case to lay the admissibility of the issue of a govern-
ment certification squarely before a court was Maynard v. Stinson Aircraft
Corp.,' where the court held that a certificate of worthiness was in-
admissible because of the inability of the defense to lay a proper foun-
dation. The court noted that the defendant company had specifically at-
tempted to elicit testimony from employees of the Department of Com-
merce, the Division of Aeronautics, for the purpose of determining exact-
ly what examination was made of the plans for the aircraft in question.
"The witnesses, however, were instructed by an attorney for the Secre-
tary of Commerce not to answer any questions concerning whether they
had ever examined the plans or whether anyone for the Department of
Commerce ever made any examination of the plans, or if they made an
examination, who made it, and what kind of an examination was made."'
The court continued, "Therefore, it affirmatively appearing that the
testimony was denied to the defendants in this case by an act of the
officer of the United States Government, it becomes impossible for this
court to receive that certificate in evidence and turn it over to the jury
for their consideration. The plans might have been carefully checked by
the experts of the United States Government. Then again, they might
not. The parties were denied the opportunity by federal officials to find
out whether they were or were not checked, and, therefore, the cer-
tificate itself becomes immaterial and incompetent in this case." 3
I think it is clear that what the court was attempting to say was that
in an action brought against an aircraft manufacturer in which an al-
legation of poor design is made, the certificate will be allowed into evi-
dence if the proper foundation is offered. Such foundation is obviously
the testimony of the examining officer who issued the certificate of air-
worthiness and his criteria for such an issuance.
In Prashker v. Beechr the question of admissibility of a Beech Bonanza's
Type Certificate was considered by the court at the pre-trial. The plain-
tiffs alleged that the aircraft had been improperly designed and that Beech
had proceeded with its manufacture of the aircraft with full knowledge
of such defects.
Beech indicated that an offer would be made of both the type and
5914 C.F.R. §418 (Revised 1961).
60 14 C.F.R. §- 418.24(6) (8) (Revised 1961).
01 1940 U.S. Avi." Rep. 71, 1 Avi. 698 (1937).62 id. at 702.
63 Id.
64258 F.2d 602 (1958).
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airworthiness certificate. The plaintiffs, however, argued that the cer-
tificates would be inadmissible unless it could be shown that the matters
in issue had been the subject of the Civil Aeronautics Administration's
(CAA) examination prior to the issuance of the certificates. The plaintiffs
further contended, apparently looking to the rationale of the Maryland
case, that the certificates could only be admitted through testimony of the
CAA inspectors who had actually granted them. The court said in its pre-
trial opinion, "I am of the opinion that the certificates would not be ad-
missible as to the general safety or approval of the plane, but would be
admissible as tending to negative notice of general unsatisfactory nature of
the plane arising from prior accidents. The complaint alleges a duty on
Beech to make tests. A certificate showing that tests were made would be
admissible to meet the allegations of the complaint, regardless of the specific
nature of the tests. ' ' "a Thus, the court in effect assumed the posture that
the receipt from the Government of the type and airworthiness certificates
was admissible on the very narrow issue of notice.
The irony of the position of the court in this case is indeed exquisite!
In essence, what the court is doing is asking a jury of twelve laymen to
decide whether or not the physicists, the engineers, the test pilots and other
experts, who made highly technical decisions in the extremenly compli-
cated field of aerodynamics, were wrong. "In short, the jury is asked to
conclude, on the basis of obscure and contradictory testimony, phrased
in vague, indefinite and speculative terms by men who never have flown
a Bonanza or witnessed a Bonanza flight, that the Bonanza design is un-
safe, although the Civil Aeronautics Administration experts came to a
different conclusion after months of study, investigation and actual flight
tests."'6
In DeVito v. United Airlines, Inc.,67 Douglas Aircraft Corporation at-
tempted to show that the emergency procedure which it had established
had been approved by the CAA. The court responded by stating:
This contention, however, ignores the important fact that the D.E.V. 133
Report submitted by Douglas to the Civil Aeronautics Administration
granted its airworthiness directives after modification, contained no refer-
ence to the effects of carbon dioxide upon flight personnel during flight
tests of January and February, 1948."
Thus, since the manufacturer failed to provide the CAA with data con-
cerning this specific problem, the validity of the certificate in question is
placed in grave doubt.
Looking to this case, it would appear that it would behoove the air-
craft manufacturer to be as candid as possible in submitting his extremely
detailed records of design and manufacture of the FAA when attempting
to secure type and airworthiness certificates. Such record keeping would
"Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Civ. No. 1643 (Aug. 13, 1957) (pre-trial opinion).
"Brief for respondant Atlantic Aviation Co., Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1958).
67 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
68 Id.
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bear heavily on the court's determination of the true value of both the
type and airworthiness certificates.
In Rapp v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,"0 the court held that the FAA at the
time the type certificate for the aircraft was issued, had a duty to promote
safety of flight in air commerce by prescribing and revising from time to
time such minimum standards governing design and performance of air-
craft engines as would be required in the interest of safety, such duties
being prescribed under Sections 601 and 603 (a) of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958. In this case, the FAA issued a type certificate for an
aircraft, attesting to its airworthiness, when it knew the aircraft was
capable of ingesting birds on takeoff, with the resultant loss of power
output. This was a serious hazard to the aircraft and the court held that
the government, by failing to provide further tests to determine the
outcome of such an encounter, negligently issued such a certificate.
It would, therefore, appear, from the holding in the Rapp case, that
the Federal Government may indeed become the unwilling partner of
the aircraft manufacturer in personal injury actions resulting from air-
craft crashes, if they can be shown to have negligently certified an
aircraft as airworthy. Further, it would seem that the airworthiness
certificate will be admissible into evidence if the proper foundation is
laid by way of the testimony of the issuing Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration inspector as to the criteria used in granting the certificate.
The current trend in aviation product liability is not at all unlike that
of product liability cases in general. The severity of the application of
the various theories of liability, however, is applied with a vigor that the
courts apparently feel is commensurate to the risk to which the public
is exposed. What follows is best perhaps described as the rather rapid
evolution of aviation products liability.
In 1955, Northwest Airlines brought action against the Glenn L.
Martin Company"0 for alleged negligence in the design and manufacture
of an aircraft, alleging the wing splice was vulnerable to metal fatigue.
The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the manufacturer, and
the airline appealed. The court of appeals held that the evidence, in-
cluding the evidence that an engineer and two or three inspectors hired
by the airline had observed the manufacture of the planes, was insufficient
to warrant an instruction on assumption of risk or instruction as to
contributory negligence based on a failure to discover the defects. The
judgment was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
What this case is stating is that one need not anticipate the negligence
of another until he becomes aware of such negligence, and further that
it is not contributory negligence to fail to look out for danger when
there is no reason to apprehend that there is indeed any danger. Here,
the court felt that the manufacturer owed a duty to the airline who had
a right to assume such a duty would be performed.
6 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967); rev'd 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1967); aff'd on rehearing,
399 F.2d 14 (1968).
10224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955).
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In North American Aviation v. Hughes," early in 1957, an action was
'brought against North American, the manufacturer of an F-86 aircraft
which had been delivered to and accepted by the United States Air Force.
The case arose out of the death of a pilot who was flying the plane from
the factory to an Air Force Base, and who was killed when the aircraft
crashed after take-off. The court held that there was substantial evi-
dence to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff on the theory that the crash
was due to a mechanical defect which developed immediately after take-
off. The proximity of delivery to the crash led the court to impose a type
of quasi, res ispa loquitur in this particular case. This case is one of the
few where this doctrine has been applied successfully against an aircraft
manufacturer.
In 1958 came Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corporation." This was an
action for wrongful death of the plaintiff's decedent who was killed
when an airplane manufactured by the defendant Beech Aircraft Cor-
poration, and sold by the co-defendant, crashed, and for the loss of the
airplane. The district court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant
and the plaintill appealed. The court of appeals held that the evidence
put forth failed to establish that the manufacturer was negligent in
designing the aircraft in question, and that the evidence also tended to
clearly establish that the crash was caused by the contributory negligence
of the pilot in attempting to fly the aircraft in extremely poor weather
conditions, the pilot was VFR qualified only, and during the course of
the flight encountered IFR conditions.
In a case of this nature, the evidence must demonstrate either a breach
of express or implied warranty by the manufacturer, if the plaintiff is
to be successful. Here, the buyer was precluded from recovering damages
for a breach of implied warranty of merchantability in view of evidence
tending to show that the damage to the aircraft was proximately caused
by the negligence of the buyer's pilot; and, further, by the fact that the
buyer's evidence failed to prove the airplane was not reasonably fit for
flying. As this case would illustrate, there is often a blatantly gross at-
tempt to recover even where the total ineptitude of the pilot is clear.
In 1961, Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown" was decided. This was an
action against the aircraft manufacturer for the death of an Air Force
crew member allegedly due to a defect in an aircraft component manu-
factured by a third party. The district court rendered judgment for
the plaintiff and the defendant subsequently appealed. The court of
appeals held that evidence supported a finding that under California
law the manfacturer had been negligent with respect to installing
an inherently defective component and that its negligence had been
the proximate cause of the accident. Under California law, a manu-
facturer who buys and installs a component which has been manufactured
by another manufacturer, is subject to the same liability as though it
7247 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1957).
72258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1958).
73291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961).
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were the manufacturer of the particular component, and is charged with
the same duty to exercise reasonable care in design and construction of
the component as well as in the testing and inspection of it when it is
installed. Further, the airplane manufacturer under California law is
liable for negligence in the design and manufacture of the component
manufactured by another, in inspecting or testing the component, and
for its own negligence in installing the component or failing to warn of
known defects. This is true even though the manufacturer was not
found negligent in failing to learn of an inherent defect in design.
Clearly, this case places an even greater burden upon the manufacturer
of the final aircraft to ensure that his subcontractors are providing him
with components which are complete and totally safe. As the decision in
Greenman would certainly indicate, the California court is by far the
most liberal and activistic in the nation. The decision in this case lends
ample credence to this theory.
In 1963, in Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United Aircraft
Corp.,"4 the supplier of gear shafts for propeller governors was held negli-
gent in failing to supply shafts which would operate under the environ-
mental conditions which the supplier knew were to be encountered. The
court stated that such negligence on the part of the supplier was the
proximate cause of the damages sustained when the shafts malfunctioned
in flight. The airline was held not contributorily negligent for continuing
to operate the aircraft after two earlier fractures occurred in flight, for
the reason that the supplier had assured the airline that the trouble
emanated from a single faulty batch of gear shafts. Although the theory
of negligence was used in this case, it is clear that strict liability in tort
under the theory espoused in Section 402 (b) of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts could well have been used today.
In Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corporation,m a 1964 case, an
action for the wrongful death of a passenger was instituted against the
air carrier, the manufacturer of the airplane, and the manufacturer of
the altimeter aboard the craft. The plaintiff appealed from an order
which dismissed their causes of action as to the manufacturers of the
airplane and the altimeter. The court of appeals held that an aircraft
manufacturer's implied warranty of fitness of the airplane for the con-
templated use ran to and in favor of an airline passenger despite the
lack of contractual privity, but the implied warranty as to the manu-
facturer of the altimeter of the airplane did not.
What this case essentially accomplished was the re-establishment of the
circuitry of action for which the courts and the advocates of strict liability
in torts have so valiantly stormed their illusory citadel. It serves to set
the stage for dog fights between co-defendants rather than adjudicat-
ing the rights of the parties in one cause of action arising from the same
incident.
14192 A.2d 913 (1963).
75 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 191 (1963).
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In Banks v. Continental Motors Corp.,76 a 1966 case, the court dis-
missed a suit against an engine manufacturer. Evidence was adduced by
an airplane owner and his insurer against the manufacturer of the
engine that the failure of the aircraft engine and the subsequent crash
was due to throttle ice forming in the air induction system. The court
held that this was insufficient to establish negligence on the part of the
engine manufacturer which had made no formal ice tests and provided
no air heat rise for a fuel injection engine.
Breach of both express and implied warranties was alleged by the
plaintiff and advertisements of the manufacturer were introduced into
evidence, which stated that its fuel injection engine eliminated icing
hazards. The court dismissed the allegation of the breach of express war-
ranty on the ground that the representations of the manufacturer were
made specifically with respect to the refrigerating effect of vaporization
icing, and not with respect to the elimination of throttling ice, of the
type found in the air induction system of the aircraft. The plaintiff's
allegation of breach of implied warranties was also dismissed, but here
on the basis that no supporting evidence had been offered. This case
served to offer some hope to the manufacturer who clearly and explicitly
advertised the use of his product. Here, the plaintiff, groping for a
deep pocket, seized upon the advertising; but the court saw through the
attempt.
Another case which came into prominence in 1966 was that of Webb
v. Zurich Insurance Co., et al." There, suits against Cessna were filed
based on warranty, and alternatively, on negligent design and manu-
facture of the aircraft. The court stated in its opinion that a careful read-
ing of the record in this case does not reveal any basis for liability on the
part of Cessna. On the contrary, it is clear that the aircraft when de-
livered was completely airworthy. The only fault testified to is some
damage to the finish of the aircraft caused by a hailstorm which occurred
after its manufacture, but before its sale. A reduction in the sale price
was given as a result thereof. Needless to say, once the aircraft was de-
livered there was no further control of it by Cessna, and the rule
of res ipsa loquitur could not be involved. Thus, the court in essence
held that the manufacturer, Cessna, was not liable for the death of the
passengers in the crash, either on the theory of negligent manufacture
of the airplane or on the theory of res ipsa loquitur, in view of the evi-
dence that the airplane was completely airworthy when delivered and
that the manufacturer did not possess any control of the airplane after
its delivery.
In 1967, two cases of importance in the field of aviation products
liability were handed down. First was Rossignol v. Danbury School of
Aeronautics, Inc., et al.," which was an action against a valve manu-
facturer, engine manufacturer, and an aircraft manufacturer, seeking
"0373 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1966).
77 194 So. 2d 435 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
79154 Conn. 549, 227 A.2d 418 (1967).
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damages for injury to an aircraft, based on theories of strict liaiblity in
tort, breach of warranties, and negligence.
The defendant, Eaton Manufacturing Co., sold an exhaust valve to
the defendant, Avco Corporation, and Avco incorporated this exhaust
valve into an engine which it manufactured and sold to the defendant,
Piper Aircraft Corporation. Piper further incorporated the engine into
an aircraft which it manufactured and sold to the defendant, Danbury
School of Aeronautics, Inc. The Danbury School sold the airplane to a
customer, who after using it, resold it to Danbury, who in turn sold it
to the plaintiff in May of 1963. In August of 1963, the airplane was
damaged in a crash landing that was due to engine failure. The specific
cause of the accident was determined as being due to a cracked, or de-
fective exhaust valve in No. 3 cylinder, probably caused by excessive
valve guide wear. At the time of the accident, the engine had been
operated for 687 hours, and the normal overhaul time for such an engine
is somewhere between 800 and 1200 hours.
Although the case presented several questions for appellate review, the
basic issue involved was whether or not the complaint alleged facts suffi-
cient to state a cause of action against Avco and Eaton, sounding in strict
tort liability, as a separate and distinct basis of liability. The court, in
analyzing the development of strict liability in tort, determined that the
minimum essential allegations to a cause of action based on that theory
were-that the defendant had indeed sold the product; that it was in
an unreasonably dangerous, defective condition to the user or consumer
or his property; that it was the cause of physical harm to said consumer
or user or his property; that the seller was normally engaged in the ac-
tivity of selling this particular product; and that it reached the user or
consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it had
been sold. The failure of the plaintiff to allege the latter was fatal to his
appeal. The court stated that his pleadings lacked an element which was
essential to a statement of a good cause of action based on the theory of
strict liability in tort.
The second case of some importance in 1967 was that of Ulmer, et al.
v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.'" In this case, three military
personnel were killed in the crash of a United States helicopter. In a
diversity action seeking recovery for the death of the occupants, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana en-
tered judgment from which the plaintiffs appealed. The court of appeals
held that the evidence justified a jury determination that the Navy had
sole possession of the helicopter from 1952 until the time of the crash
some time in 1958. Also, that the Navy had subjected the helicopter
blades to various overhauls and maintenance work during that period,
thus it was held that they were in part responsible for the crash. Con-
sequently, it was held that the aircraft was not in substantially the same
condition as it was when it left the control of the manufacturer. This,
coupled with the intervening acts of the United States Navy in the over-
" 380 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1967).
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hauling and maintenance work during the six-year period, led the court
to conclude that there would be no liability for the manufacturer of
the aircraft. This is, by the way, an excellent defense in a product liability
suit, for if there was an intervening act liability will not accrue.
In 1968, there were, as in 1967, two decisions of some note, both of
which were rendered by federal courts in the state of New York. The
first of these actions was Montgomery v. Goodyear Aircraft Corp.," in
which the aircraft involved was a non-rigid twin-engine blimp that
crashed into the ocean off the New Jersey coast. Rougly twenty-one
members of the crew were killed or died after the crash, and this action
was brought by the representatives of the estates of eleven of the decedents
against the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, which was the manu-
facturer of the fabric used in the construction of the airship envelope.
The estates of the plaintiffs based their claims upon the theory that the
blimp crashed at sea because of a tear in the skin, which was due to the
Goodyear Company's failure to properly bond one of the seams.
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district judge who
held that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the burden of proof imposed
upon them in establishing, by competent evidence, their cause of action.
This finding was essentially based upon the weight of testimony given
by eye-witnesses. They testified, in essence, that they had not seen any
tear in the envelope prior to the crash of the airship into the sea. What
they did testify to, however, was that the tear in the envelope which they
observed occurred after the airship had impacted.
The total absence of any competent evidence of a tear's existence prior
to the crash led the court to a finding that liability could be attributed
to the manufacturer only on the basis of sheer speculation. Therefore, the
defendant manufacturer was held not liable by virtue of the plaintiff's
failure to carry the burden of proof as to a defect being in existence
prior to the airship's crash.
The second action was that of Krause v. Sud-Aviation."' Here, the
aircraft involved was a helicopter that crashed into the Gulf of Mexico
and whose occupants died as a result of the crash. Actions were brought
by the representatives of the decedents for wrongful death against the
helicopter manufacturer, Sud-Aviation. The district judge who rendered
the decision in this case decided that the evidence established that the
defendant helicopter manufacturer had negligently welded the helicopter's
horizontal stabilizer bracket to the upper right longeron, resulting in a
condition known in the trade as "insufficient root penetration;" and that
the manufacturer was liable for the crash because of the failure of the
longeron.
The court further held that the fact the failure of the longeron
had occurred under normal flight conditions served to shift the burden
to the defendant manufacturer to show that abnormal stresses, rather
than a defective condition, were the proximate cause of the failure in
80231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
8' 301 F. Supp. 513 (Dis. 1968).
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question. Prior to this crash, the helicopter's rear rotor had been dipped
into the water during a practice landing, and it was the manufacturer's
theory that the fracture began at that time and progressed by subsequent
fatigue until the crash occurred. The trial judge rejected this theory,
finding that the evidence admitted failed to meet the burden of poof
that had been placed upon the manufacturer. The district judge further
held that the implied warranty doctrine is applicable to cases that arise
under the Death on the High Seas Act and that the helicopter manu-
facturer, therefore, impliedly warranted that its product would not prove
dangerous or harmful in its ordinary and intended use and breached that
warranty when the aircraft crashed as the result of a structural failure.
In March of 1969, the Minnesota supreme court decided the case of
Tayam v. Executive Aero, Inc.8" There, an action was brought against
the Mooney Aircraft Company, the manufacturer, and Executive Aero,
Inc., the dealer-seller of a 1964 Mooney Super 21 single-engine, four-place
aircraft which crashed. In a jury trial, judgment was rendered against
both the manufacturer and the dealer-seller in favor of the estate of the
plaintiffs. The manufacturer, Mooney Aircraft Company, did not appeal
from these judgments; but on appeal of the judgment by Executive
Aero, Inc., the judgment was affirmed.
The principal theory of the plaintiffs' claim was based upon the failure
to warn and that such constituted a breach of duty which was owing, and
was the negligence proximately causing the crash. The Minnesota su-
preme court held that the proof presented in the trial court clearly es-
tablished the liability upon both defendants and, further, that both the
manufacturer and the seller of the aircraft that crashed negligently failed
to warn the purchaser of the possible danger of a power failure if the
power boost equipment permitting the fuel injection engine to be oper-
ated on unfiltered air is left on while flying through conditions normally
associated with the development of ice.
The particular significance of this case is that it is clearly illustrative
of the situation where there is no theory or claim of a manufacturing
defect, and a total absence of any evidence of negligence with regard to
design or manufacture, the workmanship, materials, or inspections is
presented, and where liability is imposed only upon the sole theory and
claim of the manufacturer's and seller's duty to warn of uses that can
be reasonably foreseen and may well be encountered in the normal and
ordinary operation of the aircraft. Thus, a duty to warn will be imposed
upon the manufacturer to the purchaser in connection with operating
procedures reasonably held to be within the contemplation of the manu-
facturer.
As I noted in the opening remarks of this section, the conflicts of law
problem with regard to product liability cases has become exceedingly
complex. Such landmark decisions as Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Bab-
cock v. Jackson, Long v. Pan American Airways, Weinstein v. Eastern
82 166 N.W.2d 584 (1969).
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Airlines, Inc., and Scott v. Eastern Airlines, have all led to a drastic
change in the law within a period of less than ten years.
In the Kilberg"3 case, the facts were as follows. Edward Kilberg, 33
years of age, unmarried and without dependents, was fatally injured in
an aircraft accident in Massachusetts. He was a resident of New York
City and his mother was his sole next of kin. The action, however, was
brought by his brother, Jack Kilberg, a New York resident, as adminis-
trator, against Northeast Airlines for his wrongful death. The complaint
alleged three causes of action; the first cause seeking damages in the
amount of $15,000 for wrongful death, the second seeking $150,000 for
a breach of contract of safe carriage, and the third seeking damages in
the amount of $50,000 for conscious pain and suffering prior to his
death. In point of fact, however, Mr. Kilberg died immediately in the
accident and there was no possible provable damages for the alleged
conscious pain and suffering prior to his demise.
Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the second cause of action
upon the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. The appellate division unanimously reversed the order
of the special term denying the motion and this was unanimously
affirmed by the court of appeals. Although this was the only question
on appeal, four of the seven judges on the court sought to take advantage
of the opportunity to proclaim for New York State a new legal philoso-
phy, with respect to out-of-state limitations of damages where New
York State residents were involved. This slim majority advised the plain-
tiff he might apply "if so desired, for leave to amend his first cause of
action," this being, of course, without regard to the $15,000 wrongful
death limitation in the Massachusetts statute which he had pleaded. Thus,
the Kilberg decision did lead to the adoption of the "grouping of con-
tract" or "center of gravity" theory on conflicts of law which eventually
paved the way for New York's rejection of lex loci delecti.
The question of whether lex loci delecti was still the law in New York
State was finally settled in the landmark case of Babcock v. Jackson.""
Babcock was involved in an accident in Ontario, Canada, in which the
New York plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the Ontario death
statute. The plaintiff sought to recover against the New York driver of
the vehicle in which she was a passenger. Persuading the New York
Court of Appeals of the merits of her case, they totally rejected the
rule of lex loci delecti and adopted the center of gravity, or grouping
of contracts test. The court, in rationalizing its position, stated, "Jus-
tice, fairness, and the best practical result . . .may be achieved by
giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction, which because
of its relationship or contract with the occurrence with the parties has
the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation."
In Dym v. Gordon,' the rule in Babcock was further refined when
"Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 176 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1961).
84 12 N.Y.2d 473 (1963).
8 16 N.Y.2d 120 (1965).
1970]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
the New York Court of Appeals rejected an attempt on the part of the
defense to restrict the rule in Babcock to one of domicile.
In Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines," the question presented was whether
or not the death of a passenger resulting from the crash of an aircraft in
legislatively defined navigable waters, less than one marine league from
the shore of the state, constituted a maritime tort. The position as taken
by the Third Circuit in the Weinstein case was echoed by the court holding
in Scott v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.8" The Scott case involved a wrongful
death action for the death of a passenger in the same accident. The court,
in agreeing with Weinstein, held that the accident constituted a mari-
time tort and that, therefore, admiralty law governed the rights of all
the parties. The Massachusetts wrongful death statute limiting recovery
to $20,000 was controlling. The judgment was subsequently withdrawn
on a rehearing, and in a four to three decision the court held that Pennsyl-
vania law rather than admiralty law applied to the rights of the parties.
In Morgan v. Eastern Airlines, et al.8 the defendant aircraft manu-
facturer moved for a dismissal in a suit for damages which alleged, inter
alia, negligent design and manufacture of an airplane and breach of im-
plied warranties. Plaintiff's decedents had been killed in an airplane crash
that occurred in Louisiana. The court held that under Georgia law there
is a requirement of contractual privity as a condition precedent to an
implied warranty recovery and, therefore, the plaintiffs would have to
proceed in tort since they were not parties to the sale of the crashed
aircraft. The Georgia court went on to hold that the prevailing conflict
of laws rule concerning torts is that of lex loci delecti and accordingly
turned to the Louisiana law and determined that the plaintiffs' tort action
against the manufacturer for negligent design and manufacture would
be recognized in Louisiana.
The trend is clear, I believe, that the grouping of contacts or center
of gravity theory will soon be the law of the land. The State Legislatures
are increasingly aware of the financial burdens that will be placed on the
state and local welfare agencies, if their citizens are not adequately re-
compensed for injuries suffiered outside of the state. The courts, in many
cases, however, have saved the legislature from enacting such statutes by
the use of the time-honored, although sometimes soundly castigated,
process of judicial legislation.
Although the intent for such decisions is altruistic, and from that
standpoint, laudable, the situation described in the opening of this section
clearly reflects the difficulties that the grouping of contacts theory can
create. It is unquestionably a phase of the law that requires constant at-
tention and constant study on the part of counsel, if he is effectively to
serve his client.
86203 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Rev'd and aff'd in part 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963);
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
87264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967); rev'd, 399 F.2d 14 (1967); aff'd on rehearing, 399
F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1968).
88253 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Geo. 1966).
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IV. THE SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF AN
AVIATION PRODUCT LIABILITY CASE
By now, from what I have said, I am sure most of you have gotten
the impression that I feel that the cards are stacked against the aircraft
manufacturer in atempting to present a reasonably effective defense. How-
ever, this is not necessarily true and is not my feeling at all. There are
several effective and winning defenses in a products liability suit other
than a direct attack upon the plaintiff's proof of negligence or defect.
The primary defense, of course, is that the product, the aircraft, is not
defective. This defense actively involves the management, i.e., the engi-
neering staff, of the accused aircraft manufacturer since it will be his
expertise in concert with that of the aviation attorney that will be
needed to disprove the allegations of the defect alleged.
The second defense to aviation products liability suits is that the
defect was not the proximate cause of the accident. It might well be true
that there were only ten rivets to a panel when there should have been
fifteen, or perhaps a certain fuel line joint was not flared as much as
it should have been, but this will not meet the plaintiff's burden if the
proximate cause of the accident was the fact that he failed to see a
mountain prior to impact. Once again, this is an area where close co-
operation is necessary with the manufacturer's engineers and experts.
If evidence can be adduced through the use of expert testimony or, if
plausible, through easily understandable experiments, that the accident
could not have been caused by the defect alleged, then the finder of fact
will have to, we hope, find the manufacturer not guilty.
A third defense, and again one requiring active participation of the
aircraft manufacturer's staff, is that the product is not in the same con-
dition at the time of the accident as when it was sold by the manu-
facturer. Here, personnel of the aircraft manufacturer would be required
to examine carefully the alleged defective part and be able to show in
what way it has been changed. In addition, it would have to be shown
that there is some causal relationship or connection between the change
and the defect. As you know, with all the Federal Aviation Regulations
pertaining to inspections, overhaul, etc., it would be a rare case when an
aircraft with more than 100 flying hours had not been tampered with in
some fashion or another.
A fourth defense is the malfeasance of the injured party, or as is most
often the case in aviation litigation, his malfeasance prior to his death.
In actions based upon warranties, the plaintiff must show that he used
the product in the manner that it was intended to be used. Consequently,
it would be extremely unreasonable to hold a manufacturer liable for
the crash of a four-place aircraft that had been packed with six hefty
individuals off on a hunting trip, over grossing the aircraft by 300
pounds, or to hold him liable in the case of an aircraft not stressed for
acrobatic flight, that came apart while pulling 7 G's. Here again, as in
all of the above cases, the refutation of this allegation must require the
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full co-operation and assistance of the manufacturer to show how the
product should have been used, and how, if it had been used within
the flight envelope that it was constructed for, no difficulty would ever
have arisen.
A fifth defense, more in the realm of the creative use of procedure,
is with respect to the evidence the plaintiff may be prohibited from in-
troducing. The removal of negligence as an element of the plaintiff's
proof in a strict liability in tort case, can, in some cases, work to the
advantage of the defense. If the plaintiff need not prove negligence,
presumably evidence of negligence will be excludable by the objection
of immateriality, thus eliminating the possibility of such evidence of
negligence inflaming the passions and prejudice of the jury. In a case
brought under this doctrine, the defendant may be able to control
whether evidence of his handling comes into the case at all. If the plain-
tiff tries to demonstrate that the manufacturing plant had certain short-
comings and that perhaps the machine operator the night before had
over indulged, he can be stopped, I think. Such evidence would be ir-
relevant to a strict liability in tort claim. If indeed these facts are true,
that fact need never get before the jury and the defense can successfully
avoid the penalty verdict, which such facts might bring.
On the other hand, if the manufacturer's plant is loaded with the
most modern testing devices and is maintained like a fine Swiss chronom-
eter, if every component in every aircraft and the aircraft itself is tested
and tested again for defects, if he buys only the finest raw materials
and subjects them to the most scrupulous and exacting quality analysis
before, during and after processing, the defense should be able to show
it. Such evidence would be circumstantial evidence totally bearing on
the question of whether the component part could have been defective
when it was sold by the manufacturer. Truly, in many cases it may be
the only evidence available to a defendant on that issue. Such evidence,
however, would not be admissible to prove due care or lack of negli-
gence, which are barred as a defense, but it should be admissible as tend-
ing to disprove that the aircraft was defective at all, when it was sold by
the manufacturer. This circumstantial evidence does, without question,
have a salutary, mitigating influence on damages.
An occasional plaintiff may plead both strict liability in tort and
negligence, and if he does, the harm which may be suffered from proving
a manufacturer's negligence, will not be harm done by the doctrine of
strict liability in tort at all, but will be a harm he could have done to the
defense case anyway under the old negligence doctrine.
The designation of strict liability is deceptive. What has really hap-
pened is that the plaintiff is given another form of action to add to a
negligence count and an implied warranty count if he chooses. He still
has Some very substantial burdens of proof and the defendant has ample
opportunity for defense. One real value of the doctrine of strict liability
in tort, as noted before, is that it provides the plaintiff's counsel with a
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tool of intimidation in forcing a settlement with a defense attorney not
yet fully schooled in the sophisticated and subtle defenses to strict liability
in fort.
We must bear in mind that the defense of these products cases re-
quires no techniques vastly different from those used in ordinary negli-
gence cases. Whether the defendant was negligent in the manufacture of
the product, i.e., whether it exercised due care, is in some cases a much
more demanding question than whether a product is, in fact, defective.
However, the issue on the question of defect is a very precise and diffi-
cult one to handle. A case involving a charge of defective design in an
aircraft component of some complexity involves some highly technical
proof, and it is at this stage that the aviation attorney is best able to put
his experience and scientific background to its fullest use.
V. CONCLUSION
In this age of extraordinary technological development, there is bound
to be considerable experimentation and attendant occasional failures. This
is to be expected as industry presses beyond the present state of the art.
Without this experimentation, our progress toward the ultimate advance-
ment of technology in our society would be considerably slowed.
The notion that technological innovation should be penalized by the
imposition of liability for later developed improvements seems to be
more than just unfair between litigants, and it is one that our European
neighbors look upon in stunned dismay. It militates against the tech-
nological changes upon which all of our national hopes for abundance,
leisure and high civilization primarily depend.
The Constitution of the United States provides for a patent system
"to promote the progress of science and the useful arts" and a large share
of our Federal Budget is directed toward the research and development
of new and useful products. The Congress enacts bill after bill to foster
scientific education so that a favorable climate can be created in which
such research can proceed at an accelerated pace. All this expresses a
national policy to encourage and accelerate technological innovation, and
that policy is directly opposed by some of the novel notions of liability
now advanced by many personal injury lawyers, and unfortunately ac-
cepted by some courts.
If liability for design defects is to become an integral part of our law,
it should be based on legislative and regulative standards, and not on a
hopeless, quaking quagmire of individual tort determinations. More-
over, if a manufacturer is to be responsible for design defects, liability
should be found only where a specific finding is made that the design
used was negligently developed in light of the state of the art and stand-
ards not later than the time the accused product was sold.
The doctrine of strict liability in tort also deserves further attention.
In essence, the rule proclaims a form of socialized accident insurance in
which the manufacturers and sellers are but the mere collectors of
1970]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
premiums from the consumers of the product. At a recent meeting of a
group of New Jersey anaesthesiologists, it was decided to allot to each
patient's bill the cost of their malpractice insurance and denominate it
as such. It is not that I argue against the settlement of just claims caused
by negligence, but what I would take issue with are the over-inflated
"rogue verdicts" that bear no resemblance at all to the loss suffered, and
the ever accelerating shift of the burden of proof to the defendant-
manufacturer.
There is a vast gulf that separates wrongful death and bodily injury
awards in the U.S.A. from those in other parts of the world. In the
U.S.A., there is a high standard of living and an acute awareness of the
right of the individual in a society plagued by ever-rising prices and
wages. Even so, awards here are simply not capable of comparison with
those handed down in any other country in the world.
Cases involving the defective design of a product, or a defective prod-
uct, involve, as I noted earlier in this talk, technical evidence that is
frequently extremely difficult to explain to a juror. How can we hope to
communicate a sophisticated morass of technical facts to a jury of lay
people, usually having little or no training in technical fields? This is
the real challenge! It can be done, but it requires considerable thought,
a good working relationship between attorney and engineer, and con-
siderable time expended long before the case is called for trial. Not in-
frequently, the manufacturer and his engineer will feel confident that
the charge leveled against the product is completely unsound from an
engineering point of view and refuse to give it the very serious con-
sideration that it most certainly deserves. Those of us who have stood
before a jury, trying by word of mouth to convince them of the va-
lidity of some engineering principle, know that too frequently it is an
exercise in futility. This is particularly true if the argument is based
solely on the technical language of the engineer. Unless the attorney is
able to translate from the technical jargon of the scientist to the ver-
nacular of the layman, the scientific testimony is meaningless.
One thing that is abundantly clear in all of these cases-a suit char-
acterizing a manufacturer's product as "defective" is an attack upon
the very lifeline of his existence. Very often, the fact that such a suit is
on file appears in the trade journals circulated among his customers,
suppliers and competitors. It is almost immediately a subject of discussion
within the trade and the manufacturer can be on trial in the industry as
well as in court. The integrity and competence of the defendant is being
challenged in the area in which his success is wholly dependent. The loss
of the case can result in much more serious consequences than the amount
of the verdict or an increased insurance premium. His very existence may
well be at stake.
In fact, the aircraft manufacturer is faced with the future prospect of
a great escalation in product liability suits. Why? It is precisely because
such suits represent a source of great recovery, that is, a rich defendant
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capable of paying even the most exaggerated verdict. There is then, too,
the added bonus of a nice, impersonal corporation for which the jury is
inclined to feel absolutely no compassion.
In the case of a passenger's death or injury, the airline will most surely
pay the verdict, unless the cause of the crash can be shown to be the fault
of some other entity. The most recent past has seen a great assault upon
the United States Government for its alleged negligence in its air traffic
control activities, carried on by the Federal Aviation Administration. Some
of these suits have been meritorious, others have not; but one factor com-
mon to all has been a highly technical attempt to prove Governmental
negligence by demonstrating very slight deviations from written pro-
cedures, which may or may not have been a proximate cause of the acci-
dent. At any rate, with the now huge verdicts facing the airlines, it be-
hooves their lawyers to seek the company of a prospective partner to help
pay the verdicts which will surely be handed down.
Although it may not seem so, aircraft manufacturers have rarely been
a target defendant in aviation crash litigations. However, their day is at
hand!
Ralph Nader, safety advocate of automotive prominence, has now turned
his attention to the aircraft field. On January 21, 1970, he testified before
a U.S. Senate Subcommittee with regard to safety features of light planes,
and released a ninety page study made by two of his "raiders" wherein it is
charged that:
Flying in most light aircraft today is similar to mailing a couple of eggs and
a bag of nails together in a cardboard box.
Clearly, the case against the aircraft manufacturer is being prepared, and
without question it will be well prepared and well tried.
Several law firms and individual lawyers in the United States have
turned their attention nearly exclusively to the prosecution of plaintiffs'
aviation crash cases. These lawyers are indeed experts in the field and are
thoroughly familiar with all aspects of aviation crash litigation. In most
cases, they no longer take the "easy way out" and select the defendant that
appears to be the most liable, against whom the easiest case can be pre-
pared. These suits will now name the aircraft operator, owner, component
manufacturer and the fixed base operator who maintained the aircraft.
Second-level products liability as I refer to it, or defense of fixed base
operators and repair facilities has greatly expanded in the recent past.
These suits generally deal with failure of some specific component and are
quite detailed in nature, requiring much preparation and expert testing.
In my own opinion, they have increased for two reasons: first, more than
one defendant increases the prospect of full collectibility of verdicts and,
second, more detailed and specialized defenses have taught plaintiffs' law-
yers that the most obvious answer may not necessarily be the correct one.
So why choose? Sue everyone and let the jury decide!
In addition, the plaintiff reaps the benefit of the dog fight that gen-
erally develops when two or more defendants are accused of causing the
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same accident. The vastly increased value of aircraft hulls is another fac-
tor that insures there will be a great increase in product liability suits.
The Boeing 747 costs approximately 20 million dollars. This figure far
exceeds any total pay-out to date arising out of an airline crash. This, plus
the increased passenger capacity of their new "jumbo jets" leads one to
the obvious conclusion that dollar exposure from a single crash could run
close to 100 million dollars.
The same is true of the smaller general aviation aircraft. They are far
more sophisticated and costly today than they were a few years ago. Thus,
hull loss claims are bound to increase against the manufacturer. These will
be based upon product liability theories, of which there are many, not the
least of which is something called "design induced pilot error." This
theory is perhaps one of the greatest boons to plaintiffs since strict liability
in tort ground Prosser's Citadel into the ground. Now, in the proper case,
both the operator and the manufacturer can be held liable for the same loss,
and not even the jury need make a decision as between the two.
There is no question that product liability suits against the manu-
facturers of aircraft will greatly increase in the future. The question is,
what can be done to meet the challenge? On this point, I have some con-
crete suggestions to make.
The manufacturer must start now to prepare the defense of these cases!
Many times I have been faced with the problem of presenting a defense
that was good but, unfortunately, wasn't very long on proof. For example,
a well qualified mechanic employed by a repair facility is called upon two
or three years later to explain exactly what he did when he overhauled a
certain component. In the intervening time, he has most likely overhauled
dozens of the same type of items, thus he cannot remember specifically
what he did, nor can he specifically recall doing the overhaul of this par-
ticular component. In this case, a much better defense would be possible
if the facility had kept good records. The point is, good quality control
records, designed to bolster a defense, can be easily worked up and kept
at a minimum of expense and bother and with a maximum of effective-
ness in the eventual product liability suit.
In the case of the large losses involving the "jumbo jets" and many pas-
sengers, it would seem mandatory that the defense attorney be at the
scene of the accident as soon as possible. In this country, the National
Transportation Safety Board does an excellent job of thoroughly investi-
gating aircraft crashes. Investigation of crashes in other countries, how-
ever, are carried out with varying degrees of accuracy depending on the
jurisdiction involved. Nevertheless, what the accident investigator accom-
plishes for his purpose will probably not be satisfactory for the purposes
of evidence in a trial. Early preservation of evidence is one of the greatest
problems facing the lawyer who will be called upon later to defend these
cases. Thus, it is my recommendation that in the proper case the manu-
facturer send his trial lawyer as well as his technical representative to the
scene of the accident. In other less disastrous accidents, a close liason should
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be maintained between the lawyer and the investigator so that the prepara-
tion of the defense can begin as soon as possible after the accident occurs.
The preparation for the defense of the product liability litigation that
will arise out of the crash of one of the "new generation of jets" will not
be effective unless it is begun now! The lawyer who assumes this task will
be required to spend endless hours of study in extremely technical areas.
He will necessarily become an expert on the system or component that is
allegedly to have failed. Thereafter, and most importantly, he becomes the
interpreter who speaks knowledgeably with engineers and explains clearly
complex engineering principles to the jury.
The future in aviation product liability litigation promises, if nothing
else, to be extremely busy. The increased dollar exposure to the manu-
facturers, and the threat of single crashes creating several millions of dol-
lars worth of damage is a firm guarantee that these suits will be well pre-
pared and hard fought.
The aviation lawyer who specializes in the defense of product liability
cases can anticipate facing vastly more complex and new problems in the
area of technical proof. Cases may take years to prepare and try to a suc-
cessful conclusion. The successful defense will most assuredly depend in
large part on how much expertise the aviation lawyer brings to each case.
Surely there will be little time to learn after the suit is filed and the
battle joined.
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